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Technological gap and heterogeneous oligopoly

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  • Huang, Weihong
  • Zhang, Yang

Abstract

This paper explores the effect of technological gap on output, profits, market concentration, and social welfare in quantity setting oligopoly with firms of unequal sizes, holding different conjectures, operating with non-identical costs, and producing homogenous products. Assuming firms with relatively advanced technology adopt sophisticated Cournot strategy while the remaining with backward technology behave as price takers, we find that an increase in technological gap between two types of firms may paradoxically lead to higher profits for not only the advanced but also the backward. Moreover, wider technological distance could lead to lower market concentration and be welfare enhancing.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Weihong & Zhang, Yang, 2018. "Technological gap and heterogeneous oligopoly," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:67:y:2018:i:c:p:1-7
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2017.02.003
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Technological gap; Heterogeneous oligopoly; Market concentration; Social welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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