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Subsidies in Oligopoly Markets: a Welfare Comparison Between Symmetric and Asymmetric Costs

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  • Stephen F. Hamilton

    (Kansas State University)

  • Rickard Sandin

    (Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

This article studies welfare effects of uniform production subsidies in oligopoly markets, comparing cases of symmetric and asymmetric costs. Cost asymmetry reduces the welfare impact relative to the symmetric-cost case if the demand function is concave and magnifies the impact if demand is convex. The welfare difference increases with the degree of market power and with the cost differential in the industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen F. Hamilton & Rickard Sandin, 1997. "Subsidies in Oligopoly Markets: a Welfare Comparison Between Symmetric and Asymmetric Costs," Public Finance Review, , vol. 25(6), pages 660-668, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:25:y:1997:i:6:p:660-668
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219702500606
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    1. Dierickx, I. & Matutes, C. & Neven, D., 1988. "Indirect taxation and cournot equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 385-399.
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    3. Kimmel, Sheldon, 1992. "Effects of Cost Changes on Oligopolists' Profits," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 441-449, December.
    4. Besley, Timothy, 1989. "Commodity taxation and imperfect competition : A note on the effects of entry," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 359-367, December.
    5. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
    6. F. H. Hahn, 1962. "The Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 29(4), pages 329-331.
    7. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-122, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ludovic A. Julien & Anicet Kabre & Louis de Mesnard, 2022. "Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?," Post-Print hal-03791673, HAL.
    2. Hamilton, Stephen F., 1999. "Demand shifts and market structure in free-entry oligopoly equilibria," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 259-275, February.
    3. Huang, Weihong & Zhang, Yang, 2018. "Technological gap and heterogeneous oligopoly," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 1-7.

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    JEL classification:

    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods

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