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What determines where opportunity knocks? Political affiliation in the selection of Opportunity Zones

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  • Margaret Frank, Mary
  • Hoopes, Jeffrey L.
  • Lester, Rebecca

Abstract

We examine the role of political affiliation during the selection of Opportunity Zones, a place-based tax incentive enacted by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. We find governors are on average 7.6% more likely to select a census tract as an Opportunity Zone when the tract’s state representative is a member of the governor’s political party. This effect is incremental to local demographic factors that increased the likelihood of selection, such as lower income levels and preceding improvements in local conditions. Selection of politically affiliated tracts is greatest in Republican-governed states, where the effect increases to 13.2%. Furthermore, we find two procedures used by some governors when selecting Opportunity Zones – proportional allocation across a state and delegation of initial nominations to local authorities – offset the role of political affiliation. These results enhance our understanding of the selection of place-based economic incentives, providing evidence relevant for concurrent and future academic literature and legislative proposals.

Suggested Citation

  • Margaret Frank, Mary & Hoopes, Jeffrey L. & Lester, Rebecca, 2022. "What determines where opportunity knocks? Political affiliation in the selection of Opportunity Zones," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:206:y:2022:i:c:s0047272721002243
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104588
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    Cited by:

    1. James Alm & Trey Dronyk‐Trosper & Sean Larkin, 2024. "Do opportunity zones create opportunities? The impact of opportunity zones on real estate prices," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 52(1), pages 214-238, January.
    2. Jonathan A. Wiley & Hana Nguyen, 2022. "Cherry‐picking industrial properties in opportunity zones," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1201-1230, September.
    3. Rupasingha, Anil & Davis, James C., 2024. "Early Impacts of Opportunity Zones on Minority and Rural Employment," 2024 Annual Meeting, July 28-30, New Orleans, LA 343540, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Place-based tax incentives; Opportunity zones; Tax Cuts and Jobs Act;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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