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Impure prosocial motivation in charity provision: Warm-glow charities and implications for public funding

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  • Scharf, Kimberley

Abstract

We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other hand, face verification constraints that make them less flexible relative to private donations. Switching from direct grants to government subsidies for private donations can thus produce a positive pro-competitive effect on charity selection, raising the value of charity provision per dollar of funding.

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  • Scharf, Kimberley, 2014. "Impure prosocial motivation in charity provision: Warm-glow charities and implications for public funding," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 50-57.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:114:y:2014:i:c:p:50-57
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.10.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2016. "Information, competition, and the quality of charities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 64-77.
    2. Lapointe, Simon & Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley & Tukiainen, Janne, 2018. "Does market size matter for charities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 127-145.
    3. Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2017. "Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects," Working Papers 6/17, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
    4. Gallier, Carlo & Goeschl, Timo & Kesternich, Martin & Lohse, Johannes & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2023. "Inter-charity competition under spatial differentiation: Sorting, crowding, and spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 457-468.
    5. Krieg, Justin & Samek, Anya, 2017. "When charities compete: A laboratory experiment with simultaneous public goods," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 40-57.
    6. Anthony Heyes & Steve Martin, 2017. "Social Labeling by Competing NGOs: A Model with Multiple Issues and Entry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(6), pages 1800-1813, June.
    7. Carpenter, Jeffrey, 2021. "The shape of warm glow: Field experimental evidence from a fundraiser," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 555-574.
    8. Gani Aldashev & Esteban Jaimovich & Thierry Verdier, 2023. "The Dark Side of Transparency: Mission Variety and Industry Equilibrium in Decentralised Public Good Provision," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(654), pages 2085-2109.
    9. Gani Aldashev & Marco Marini & Thierry Verdier, 2020. "Samaritan Bundles: Fundraising Competition and Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(630), pages 1541-1582.
    10. Mayo, Jennifer, 2021. "How do big gifts affect rival charities and their donors?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 575-597.
    11. Carlo Perroni & Ganna Pogrebna & Sarah Sandford & Kimberley Ann Scharf, 2014. "Are Donors Afraid of Charities' Core Costs? Scale Economies in Non-profit Provision and Charity Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 5024, CESifo.
    12. Joaquín Morales Belpair, 2016. "Decentralized aid and democracy," Investigación & Desarrollo, Universidad Privada Boliviana, vol. 2(1), pages 5-17.
    13. Bach-Mortensen, Anders Malthe & Barlow, Jane, 2021. "Outsourced austerity or improved services? A systematic review and thematic synthesis of the experiences of social care providers and commissioners in quasi-markets," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 276(C).
    14. Anthony Heyes & Steve Martin, 2018. "Inefficient NGO labels: Strategic proliferation and fragmentation in the market for certification," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 206-220, June.
    15. Poret, Sylvaine, 2019. "Label wars: Competition among NGOs as sustainability standard setters," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 1-18.
    16. Amihai Glazer & Rune Jansen Hagen & Jørn Rattsø, 2018. "Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 302-321, May.
    17. Umer, Hamza, 2020. "Revisiting generosity in the dictator game: Experimental evidence from Pakistan," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    18. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2019. "Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers hal-02176269, HAL.
    19. Sylvaine Poret, 2017. "Label Battles: Competition among NGOs as Standard Setters," Working Papers hal-01512229, HAL.
    20. Lange, Andreas & Price, Michael K. & Santore, Rudy, 2017. "Signaling quality through gifts: Implications for the charitable sector," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 48-61.
    21. Jan Schmitz, 2021. "Is Charitable Giving a Zero-Sum Game? The Effect of Competition Between Charities on Giving Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(10), pages 6333-6349, October.
    22. Scharf, Kimberley & Tukiainen, Janne, 2015. "Does Market Size Matter Also for Charities?," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 226, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    23. Scharf, Kimberley & Perroni, Carlo & Pogrebna, Ganna & Sandford, Sarah, 2014. "Are Donors Afraid of Charities' Core Costs? Scale Economies in Non-profit Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers 10179, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Heyes, Anthony & Martin, Steve, 2015. "NGO mission design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 197-210.
    25. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2018. "Prosocial Motivation and Incentives," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 10(1), pages 411-438, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Private provision of public goods; Warm glow; Tax incentives for giving; Competition in the nonprofit sector;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise

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