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Private goods and services contracts: Increased emergency response capacity or increased vulnerability?

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  • Egan, M. Jude

Abstract

The United States public sector increasingly contracts with and relies on private firms to provide public goods. While this has brought efficiency gains in many contexts, in the disaster response context, these gains may be offset by increasing vulnerability to the public emergency response system by making it subject to the fragility of lean supply chains. Public-private contracts rely on the private law enforcement regime, an analysis of which indicates that there may be disincentives for private contractors to perform contractual obligations as disasters disrupt efficient supply chains and increase the cost of performance. This article argues that increasing public sector reliance on private contractor performance under extreme stress and uncertainty increases the complexity and interdependence of component parts of the disaster response system, key predictors of system failure. This article addresses the challenge of relying on private firms to provide public goods during a disaster and suggests several possibilities to increase reliability.

Suggested Citation

  • Egan, M. Jude, 2010. "Private goods and services contracts: Increased emergency response capacity or increased vulnerability?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 46-56, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:126:y:2010:i:1:p:46-56
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt3w34j60j, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Yossi Sheffi, 2005. "The Resilient Enterprise: Overcoming Vulnerability for Competitive Advantage," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262693496, April.
    3. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 585-608, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yao, Chen & Fan, Bo & Zhao, Yupan & Cheng, Xinyue, 2023. "Evolutionary dynamics of supervision-compliance game on optimal pre-positioning strategies in relief supply chain management," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(PB).
    2. Yusen Ye & Wen Jiao & Hong Yan, 2020. "Managing Relief Inventories Responding to Natural Disasters: Gaps Between Practice and Literature," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(4), pages 807-832, April.
    3. Gossler, Timo & Wakolbinger, Tina & Nagurney, Anna & Daniele, Patrizia, 2019. "How to increase the impact of disaster relief: A study of transportation rates, framework agreements and product distribution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(1), pages 126-141.
    4. Abhishek Behl & Pankaj Dutta, 2019. "Humanitarian supply chain management: a thematic literature review and future directions of research," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 283(1), pages 1001-1044, December.
    5. Su, Qiang & Luo, Qinyi & Huang, Samuel H., 2015. "Cost-effective analyses for emergency medical services deployment: A case study in Shanghai," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 112-123.

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