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The institutional determinants of self-governance: a comment on Edward Stringham’s Private Governance

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  • Bruce Benson

    (Florida State University)

Abstract

Many pages would be require to discuss Private Governance’s important contributions, so I focus on a relatively minor flaw: chapter 9 on moral beliefs is inconsistent with Stringham’s general treatment of private governance institutions as endogenous. Moral beliefs are essentially depicted as unchanging, but they actually are endogenous too. Individuals can pursue wealth through cooperative interaction, which requires trust, creating incentives to develop beliefs that encourage ethical and benevolent behavior. Alternatively wealth can be taken from others through force and/or guile. Beliefs to facilitate involuntary transfers also are institutionalized. For instance, in order to benefit from coercive wealth transfers “in good conscience,” recipients have incentives to see their victims as enemies to justify a moral “right” to transfers. Changing moral beliefs is costly, however, so they tend to be fixed in the short term. Once it becomes apparent that existing beliefs significantly conflict with an individual’s interests, she is forced to question those beliefs. The impetus for rationalizing new beliefs arises. The direction of evolution can be predicted with a rational decision-making model. To illustrate the endogeneity of moral beliefs, three institutional settings are examined: “dignity culture,” “honor culture,” and “victimhood culture”.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Benson, 2018. "The institutional determinants of self-governance: a comment on Edward Stringham’s Private Governance," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 31(2), pages 209-230, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:31:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11138-017-0382-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-017-0382-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Angelini & Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani, 2020. "Governance efficiency with and without government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 183-200, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral beliefs; Property rights; Dignity culture; Honor culture; Victimhood culture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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