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Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual‐Level Analysis

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  • Cameron D. Anderson

Abstract

An important component of incumbent support is the reward/punishment calculus of economic voting. Previous work has shown that “clarity of responsibility” within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice: where clarity is high (low), economic effects are greater (less). This article advances the “clarity of responsibility” argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting. In institutional contexts of multilevel governance, the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult. This article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government. Individual‐level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 are used to test this proposition. Results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance.

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  • Cameron D. Anderson, 2006. "Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual‐Level Analysis," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 449-463, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:50:y:2006:i:2:p:449-463
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00194.x
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    1. Aida Díaz & Clara Riba, 1999. "Catalan government popularity. An example of economic effects on sub-national government support," Economics Working Papers 406, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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    Cited by:

    1. Crasneac Alexandru Octavian, 2012. "Local Borrowing Autonomy As Part Of Fiscal Decentralization Process," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(2), pages 449-453, December.
    2. Ferraresi, Massimiliano & Gucciardi, Gianluca, 2022. "Political alignment, centralisation, and the sense of government unpreparedness during the COVID-19 pandemic," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    3. Lucas, David S. & Boudreaux, Christopher J., 2020. "National regulation, state-level policy, and local job creation in the United States: A multilevel perspective," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(4).
    4. M. Rodwan Abouharb & David Cingranelli & Mikhail Filippov, 2019. "Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(5), pages 1-22, May.
    5. Juan Herreño & Matias Morales & Mathieu Pedemonte, 2023. "The Effect of Local Economic Shocks on Local and National Elections," Working Papers 23-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    6. Lucas, David & Boudreaux, Christopher, 2018. "Federal Regulation, Job Creation, and the Moderating Effect of State Economic Freedom," MPRA Paper 92593, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Astudillo, Javier, 2014. "Should I stay or should I go? Losers’ fate and the role of Spanish political parties in candidate renomination for regional executive office," INDEM - Working Paper Business Economic Series 18317, Instituto para el Desarrollo Empresarial (INDEM).
    8. David S. Lucas & Christopher J. Boudreaux, 2019. "The Interdependence of Hierarchical Institutions: Federal Regulation, Job Creation, and the Moderating Effect of State Economic Freedom," Papers 1903.02924, arXiv.org.
    9. Hyunwoo Kim, 2023. "Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability: how central bank independence conditions economic voting," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 939-964, May.
    10. Jula, Dorin & Jula, Nicolae Marius, 2009. "Regional Economic Voting In Romania," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 6(1), pages 5-15, March.
    11. Kendall D. Funk & Erica Owen, 2020. "Consequences of an Anti‐Corruption Experiment for Local Government Performance in Brazil," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(2), pages 444-468, March.
    12. Monica Martinez-Bravo & Carlos Sanz, 2022. "The Management of the Pandemic and its Effects on Trust and Accountability," Working Papers wp2022_2207, CEMFI.
    13. Robert Johns & James Mitchell & David Denver & Charles Pattie, 2009. "Valence Politics in Scotland: Towards an Explanation of the 2007 Election," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 57(1), pages 207-233, March.
    14. Ruth Dassonneville & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, 2018. "Growth, inequality, and party support: Valence and positional economic voting," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 1804, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.

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