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Do Incompetent Politicians Breed Populist Voters? Evidence from Italian Municipalities

Author

Listed:
  • Boffa Federico

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Free University of Bozen/Bolzano and Collegio Carlo Alberto, Italy;)

  • Mollisi Vincenzo

    (Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics, University of Torino, Torino, Italy;)

  • Ponzetto A. M. Giacomo

    (CREI, UPF, IPEG and BSE, Spain;)

Abstract

Poor performance by the established political class can drive voters towards anti- establishment outsiders. Is the ineffectiveness of incumbent politicians an important driver of the recent rise of populist parties? We provide an empirical test exploiting a sharp discontinuity in the wage of local politicians as a function of population in Italian municipalities. We find that the more skilled local politicians and more effective local government in municipalities above the threshold cause a significant drop in voter support for the populist Five-Star Movement in regional and national elections. Support for incumbent governing parties increases instead.

Suggested Citation

  • Boffa Federico & Mollisi Vincenzo & Ponzetto A. M. Giacomo, 2024. "Do Incompetent Politicians Breed Populist Voters? Evidence from Italian Municipalities," Working papers 087, Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
    • Handle: RePEc:tur:wpapnw:087
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/tur/wpapnw/m87.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Populism; Government efficiency; Politician quality; Political agency.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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