Terrorist training: Onsite or via the Internet?
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101878
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Cited by:
- Kelejian, Harry H. & Mukerji, Purba, 2022. "Causal factors of terrorist attacks on countries, and corresponding spill-overs between them," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
- Sara Jeza Alotaibi, 2022. "A New Internet of Things (IoT) Framework for Public Sectors," International Journal of Information Technology and Web Engineering (IJITWE), IGI Global, vol. 17(1), pages 1-15, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
Terrorism; Incentives; Training and motivation; Counterterrorism;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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