IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pacfin/v51y2018icp376-391.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Compensation structure of family business groups

Author

Listed:
  • Kim, Hohyun
  • Han, Seung Hun

Abstract

We examine executive compensation structures with a focus on family business groups in Korea. Our results show that Korean family business groups provide 60% more total compensation to CEOs who are family members than to professional CEOs. This excessive increment is not based on performance-contingent payments, but on fixed payments. Our propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analyses robustly support these results. Further, we find that operation of internal capital markets, CEO talents, CEO stock ownership, and family board membership do not explain the excessive compensation of family CEOs in family business groups. The evidence indicates rent extraction through executive compensation in family business groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Hohyun & Han, Seung Hun, 2018. "Compensation structure of family business groups," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 376-391.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:376-391
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2018.09.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X16303213
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.pacfin.2018.09.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Conyon, Martin J. & He, Lerong, 2011. "Executive compensation and corporate governance in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1158-1175, September.
    2. Gil S. Bae & Youngsoon S. Cheon & Jun-Koo Kang, 2008. "Intragroup Propping: Evidence from the Stock-Price Effects of Earnings Announcements by Korean Business Groups," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(5), pages 2015-2060, September.
    3. Michael L. Lemmon & Karl V. Lins, 2003. "Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1445-1468, August.
    4. Heitor Almeida & Chang‐Soo Kim & Hwanki Brian Kim, 2015. "Internal Capital Markets in Business Groups: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2539-2586, December.
    5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    6. Amoako-Adu, Ben & Baulkaran, Vishaal & Smith, Brian F., 2011. "Executive compensation in firms with concentrated control: The impact of dual class structure and family management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1580-1594.
    7. Firth, Michael & Fung, Peter M.Y. & Rui, Oliver M., 2006. "Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 693-714, September.
    8. Jae‐Seung Baek & Jun‐Koo Kang & Inmoo Lee, 2006. "Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(5), pages 2415-2449, October.
    9. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2003. "Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 27(4), pages 367-382, October.
    10. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    11. Daphne W. Yiu & Yuan Lu & Garry D. Bruton & Robert E. Hoskisson, 2007. "Business Groups: An Integrated Model to Focus Future Research," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(8), pages 1551-1579, December.
    12. Adams, Renée & Almeida, Heitor & Ferreira, Daniel, 2009. "Understanding the relationship between founder-CEOs and firm performance," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 136-150, January.
    13. Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, 2006. "The Role of Family in Family Firms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 73-96, Spring.
    14. Shin, Hyun-Han & Park, Young S., 1999. "Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean 'chaebols'," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 169-191, June.
    15. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    16. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    17. Kee‐Hong Bae & Jun‐Koo Kang & Jin‐Mo Kim, 2002. "Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2695-2740, December.
    18. Jane A. Craighead & Michel L. Magnan & Linda Thorne, 2004. "The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Performance†Based CEO Compensation," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(2), pages 369-398, June.
    19. Kim, So Yeon & Lee, Kang Ryun & Shin, Hyun-Han, 2017. "The enhanced disclosure of executive compensation in Korea," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 72-83.
    20. Croci, Ettore & Gonenc, Halit & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2012. "CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in Continental Europe," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3318-3335.
    21. Yangmin Kim, 2005. "Board Network Characteristics and Firm Performance in Korea," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(6), pages 800-808, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Choi, Yoon K. & Han, Seung Hun & Kwon, Yonghyun, 2024. "Relative performance evaluation with business group affiliation as a source of common risk," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    2. Waldkirch, Matthias, 2020. "Non-family CEOs in family firms: Spotting gaps and challenging assumptions for a future research agenda," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1).
    3. Bansal, Shashank & Thenmozhi, M., 2020. "Does concentrated founder ownership affect board independence? Role of corporate life cycle and ownership identity," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    4. Muhammad Shaukat Malik & Mian Muhammad Tayyab, 2019. "Impact of Family Ownership on Organizational Performance With the Moderating Role of Active Versus Passive Control: A Case of Pakistan’s Private Sector," International Journal of Human Resource Studies, Macrothink Institute, vol. 9(4), pages 19-37, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cheng, Minying & Lin, Bingxuan & Wei, Minghai, 2015. "Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 238-257.
    2. Kwon, Yonghyun & Han, Seung Hun & Lee, Bong-Soo, 2016. "Financial constraints and negative spillovers in business groups: Evidence from Korea," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 84-100.
    3. Gam, Yong Kyu & Gupta, Paramita & Im, Jieun & Shin, Hojong, 2021. "Evasive shareholder meetings and corporate fraud," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    4. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Andros Gregoriou, 2010. "‘Family’ Ownership, Tunnelling And Earnings Management: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 705-730, September.
    5. Bereskin, Frederick L. & Kim, Bushik & Oh, Frederick Dongchuhl, 2015. "Do credit rating concerns lead to better corporate governance? Evidence from Korea," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PB), pages 592-608.
    6. Croci, Ettore & Gonenc, Halit & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2012. "CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in Continental Europe," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3318-3335.
    7. Denis Yongmin Joe & Frederick Dongchuhl Oh, 2018. "Spillover Effects Within Business Groups: The Case of Korean Chaebols," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(3), pages 1396-1412, March.
    8. Kato, Takao & Kim, Woochan & Lee, Ju Ho, 2007. "Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 36-55, January.
    9. Ducret, Romain, 2021. "Investors' perception of business group membership during an economic crisis : Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic," FSES Working Papers 524, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
    10. Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
    11. Viswanathan Nagarajan & Pitabas Mohanty & Apalak Khatua, 2023. "Financing effects of corporate diversification: A review," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 17(7), pages 2555-2585, October.
    12. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195, October.
    13. Liu, Yunxiao & Kim, Woochan & Sung, Taeyoon, 2021. "Investment efficiency of firms outside the business group," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    14. Manika Kohli, 2018. "Impact of Ownership Type and Board Characteristics on the Pay–Performance Relationship: Evidence from India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 11(1), pages 1-34, June.
    15. Muhammad Fayyaz Sheikh & Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah & Saeed Akbar, 2018. "Firm performance, corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(18), pages 2012-2027, April.
    16. Jiang, Lin & Kling, Gerhard & Bo, Hong & Driver, Ciaran, 2017. "Why do firms adopt stock options and who benefits? A natural experiment in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA), pages 124-140.
    17. Hu, Fang & Tan, Weiqiang & Xin, Qingquan & Yang, Sixian, 2013. "How do market forces affect executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 78-87.
    18. Katarzyna Cieślak, 2018. "Agency conflicts, executive compensation regulations and CEO pay-performance sensitivity: evidence from Sweden," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(3), pages 535-563, September.
    19. Kang, Hyung Cheol & Anderson, Robert M. & Eom, Kyong Shik & Kang, Sang Koo, 2017. "Controlling shareholders' value, long-run firm value and short-term performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 340-353.
    20. Marizah Minhat & Mazni Abdullah, 2014. "Executive compensation in government-linked companies: evidence from Malaysia," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(16), pages 1861-1872, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CEO compensation; Family business group; Family CEO;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:376-391. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/pacfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.