IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v87y2017icp22-30.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Seat allocation in federal second chambers: Logical models in Canada and Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Allen, Trevor J.
  • Taagepera, Rein

Abstract

Most federal second chambers give subunits equal representation. A few apply per capita representation, like most first chambers. Only Germany and Canada compromise between territorial and per capita representations. Both broadly allocate seats following the power equation format Si=SPin/∑Pkn. Two values have been proposed for n. The rigid n=0.5 approximates the Canadian pattern but does not fit the German. The flexible n=[1/logT−1/logS]/[1/logT−1/logP] takes into account the number of subunits (T) and total seats (S), for given total population (P). The flexible model better predicts seat allocation both in Canada and Germany. This model has been shown to apply to the European Parliament and the EU Council. Hence it may express what countries intuitively grope for when trying to strike a compromise between representations per capita and per subunit. As such, it does not fit the seat allocation of administrative subunits in unitary states, France and Italy.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Trevor J. & Taagepera, Rein, 2017. "Seat allocation in federal second chambers: Logical models in Canada and Germany," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 22-30.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:87:y:2017:i:c:p:22-30
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.01.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489617300306
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.01.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rose, Richard & Bernhagen, Patrick & Borz, Gabriela, 2012. "Evaluating competing criteria for allocating parliamentary seats," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 85-89.
    2. Duff, Andrew, 2012. "Finding the balance of power in a post-national democracy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 74-77.
    3. Moberg, Axel, 2012. "EP seats: The politics behind the math," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 78-84.
    4. Laslier, Jean-François, 2012. "Why not proportional?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 90-93.
    5. Grimmett, Geoffrey R., 2012. "European apportionment via the Cambridge Compromise," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 68-73.
    6. Yukio Koriyama & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2013. "Optimal Apportionment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 584-608.
    7. Rein Taagepera & Madeleine O. Hosli, 2006. "National Representation in International Organizations: The Seat Allocation Model Implicit in the European Union Council and Parliament," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54, pages 370-398, June.
    8. Rein Taagepera & Madeleine O. Hosli, 2006. "National Representation in International Organizations: The Seat Allocation Model Implicit in the European Union Council and Parliament," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(2), pages 370-398, June.
    9. Dieter K. Buse, 2002. "Federalism and Identity: Bremen, 1945-1960s," Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 33-50.
    10. Theil, Henri, 1969. "The Desired Political Entropy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 521-525, June.
    11. Alem Habtu, 2005. "Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 35(2), pages 313-335, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Katarzyna Cegiełka & Piotr Dniestrzański & Janusz Łyko & Arkadiusz Maciuk & Maciej Szczeciński, 2021. "A neutral core of degressively proportional allocations under lexicographic preferences of agents," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 11(4), pages 667-685, December.
    2. Biró, Péter & Kóczy, László Á. & Sziklai, Balázs, 2015. "Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 32-41.
    3. Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2021. "Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 70-111, August.
    4. Markus Brill & Jean-François Laslier & Piotr Skowron, 2018. "Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(3), pages 358-382, July.
    5. Casella, Alessandra & Laslier, Jean-François & Macé, Antonin, 2017. "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 239-259.
    6. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017. "Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
    7. Madeleine O. Hosli, 2008. "Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 076-096, March.
    8. Macé, Antonin & Treibich, Rafael, 2012. "Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 141-151.
    9. Słomczyński, Wojciech & Życzkowski, Karol, 2012. "Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 94-101.
    10. Laslier, Jean-François, 2012. "Why not proportional?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 90-93.
    11. Madeleine O. Hosli & M. C. J. Uriot, 2011. "Dimensions of Political Contestation: Voting in the Council of the European Union before the 2004 Enlargement," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 231-248, November.
    12. Blanca L Delgado-Márquez & Michael Kaeding & Antonio Palomares, 2013. "A more balanced composition of the European Parliament with degressive proportionality," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 458-471, September.
    13. Konstantinos Matakos & Riikka Savolainen & Orestis Troumpounis & Janne Tukiainen & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2024. "Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 883-916.
    14. Konstantinos Matakos & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2015. "Turnout and Polarization Under Alternative Electoral Systems," Studies in Political Economy, in: Norman Schofield & Gonzalo Caballero (ed.), The Political Economy of Governance, edition 127, pages 335-362, Springer.
    15. Wada, Junichiro & Kamahara, Yuta, 2018. "Studying malapportionment using α-divergence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 77-89.
    16. Yukio Koriyama & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2013. "Optimal Apportionment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 584-608.
    17. Martijn Huysmans & Christophe Crombez, 2020. "Making exit costly but efficient: the political economy of exit clauses and secession," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 89-110, March.
    18. Laszlo A. Koczy & Peter Biro & Balazs Sziklai, 2017. "US vs. European Apportionment Practices: The Conflict between Monotonicity and Proportionality," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1716, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    19. Wada, Junichiro, 2012. "A divisor apportionment method based on the Kolm–Atkinson social welfare function and generalized entropy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 243-247.
    20. Ocaña, Francisco & Oñate, Pablo, 2011. "IndElec: A Software for Analyzing Party Systems and Electoral Systems," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 42(i06).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:87:y:2017:i:c:p:22-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.