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A more balanced composition of the European Parliament with degressive proportionality

Author

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  • Blanca L Delgado-Márquez
  • Michael Kaeding
  • Antonio Palomares

Abstract

Degressive proportionality constitutes the main conceptual criterion to determine the composition of the European Parliament (EP). In reality, however, this concept entails serious practical problems as exemplified by the current distribution of seats in the EP. This article takes up the call and presents a new method for a better balanced seat allocation in the EP after the 2014 elections. Comparing with recent methods in the field, our results reveal that the method proposed yields a more balanced and juster parliamentary seat distribution among all European member states by joining the strengths of the existing methods and avoiding their weaknesses. In light of upcoming rounds of enlargement and possible amendments to the EP's internal rules of procedure and existing EU Treaties, we contend that our results are not only of interest to the academic world.

Suggested Citation

  • Blanca L Delgado-Márquez & Michael Kaeding & Antonio Palomares, 2013. "A more balanced composition of the European Parliament with degressive proportionality," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 458-471, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:14:y:2013:i:3:p:458-471
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116513485470
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Victoriano Ramírez & Antonio Palomares & Maria L. Márquez, 2006. "Degressively Proportional Methods for the Allotment of the European Parliament Seats Amongst the EU Member States," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Bruno Simeone & Friedrich Pukelsheim (ed.), Mathematics and Democracy, pages 205-220, Springer.
    3. Laslier, Jean-François, 2012. "Why not proportional?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 90-93.
    4. Grimmett, Geoffrey R., 2012. "European apportionment via the Cambridge Compromise," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 68-73.
    5. Bowler, Shaun & Farrell, David M., 1995. "The Organizing of the European Parliament: Committees, Specialization and Co-ordination," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 219-243, April.
    6. Słomczyński, Wojciech & Życzkowski, Karol, 2012. "Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 94-101.
    7. Ramírez González, V. & Martínez Aroza, J. & Márquez García, A., 2012. "Spline methods for degressive proportionality in the composition of the European Parliament," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 114-120.
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    Cited by:

    1. Piotr Dniestrzański & Janusz Łyko, 2015. "The Disproportion Of Allocation Under The Given Boundary Conditions," Economy & Business Journal, International Scientific Publications, Bulgaria, vol. 9(1), pages 118-126.

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