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Resource configuration, inter-firm networks, and organizational performance

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  • Anjos, Fernando

Abstract

Empirically-documented associations between network position and organizational performance could be driven by unobserved resources. I study this issue theoretically, by developing an equilibrium model of inter-firm network formation. Specifically, I investigate how an organization’s resource configuration impacts both network position and performance. Under certain conditions, I show that variation in resources induces no relationship between performance and either degree or centrality; or this relationship is even negative. This result is driven by the existence of organizations that find highly complementary partners. Such organizations perform well and focus most resources within the highly-complementary alliance, which in turn makes them less central.

Suggested Citation

  • Anjos, Fernando, 2016. "Resource configuration, inter-firm networks, and organizational performance," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 37-48.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:37-48
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.04.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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