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A power-weighted variant of the EU27 Cambridge Compromise

Author

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  • Grimmett, G.R.
  • Oelbermann, K.-F.
  • Pukelsheim, F.

Abstract

The Cambridge Compromise composition of the European Parliament allocates five base seats to each Member State’s citizenry, and apportions the remaining seats proportionately to population figures using the divisor method with rounding upwards and observing a 96 seat capping. The power-weighted variant avoids the capping step, proceeding instead by a non-linear downweighting of the population figures until the largest State is allocated exactly 96 seats. The pertinent calculations of the variant are described, and its relative constitutional merits are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Grimmett, G.R. & Oelbermann, K.-F. & Pukelsheim, F., 2012. "A power-weighted variant of the EU27 Cambridge Compromise," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 136-140.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:2:p:136-140
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.11.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Geoffrey Grimmett & Jean-François Laslier & Friedrich Pukelsheim & Victoriano Ramirez Gonzalez & Richard J. Rose & Wojciech Slomczynski & Martin Zachariasen & Karol Życzkowski, 2011. "The allocation between the EU member states of the seats in the European Parliament Cambridge Compromise," Working Papers hal-00609946, HAL.
    2. Grimmett, Geoffrey R., 2012. "European apportionment via the Cambridge Compromise," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 68-73.
    3. Heinrich Lothar & Pukelsheim Friedrich & Schwingenschlögl Udo, 2005. "On stationary multiplier methods for the rounding of probabilities and the limiting law of the Sainte-Laguë divergence," Statistics & Risk Modeling, De Gruyter, vol. 23(2), pages 117-129, February.
    4. Friedrich Pukelsheim & Albert W. Marshall & Ingram Olkin, 2002. "A majorization comparison of apportionment methods in proportional representation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 885-900.
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    Cited by:

    1. Blanca L Delgado-Márquez & Michael Kaeding & Antonio Palomares, 2013. "A more balanced composition of the European Parliament with degressive proportionality," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 458-471, September.
    2. Katarzyna Cegiełka & Piotr Dniestrzański & Janusz Łyko & Arkadiusz Maciuk & Maciej Szczeciński, 2021. "A neutral core of degressively proportional allocations under lexicographic preferences of agents," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 11(4), pages 667-685, December.
    3. Wenruo Lyu & Liang Zhao, 2023. "Axioms and Divisor Methods for a Generalized Apportionment Problem with Relative Equality," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(15), pages 1-13, July.
    4. Słomczyński, Wojciech & Życzkowski, Karol, 2012. "Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 94-101.

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