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The minimum-based procedure: A principled way to allocate seats in the European Parliament

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  • Kellermann, Thomas

Abstract

This work proposes the minimum-based procedure for the allocation of seats in the European Parliament taking into account the criticism of the Cambridge Compromise proposal. The procedure is underpinned by the (base + strict prop) system which only allocates a minimum number of seats to the Member States. The degree (effective maximum number) and type (distribution of remaining seats) of degressivity remain essentially a political decision.

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  • Kellermann, Thomas, 2012. "The minimum-based procedure: A principled way to allocate seats in the European Parliament," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 102-106.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:2:p:102-106
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.004
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    1. Geoffrey Grimmett & Jean-François Laslier & Friedrich Pukelsheim & Victoriano Ramirez Gonzalez & Richard J. Rose & Wojciech Slomczynski & Martin Zachariasen & Karol Życzkowski, 2011. "The allocation between the EU member states of the seats in the European Parliament Cambridge Compromise," Working Papers hal-00609946, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. Słomczyński, Wojciech & Życzkowski, Karol, 2012. "Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 94-101.

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