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Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems

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  • Yeh, Chun-Hsien

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  • Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2006. "Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 637-652, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:42:y:2006:i:6:p:637-652
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    1. Aleskerov, Fuad, 2002. "Categories of arrovian voting schemes," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 95-129, Elsevier.
    2. Chambers, Christopher P., 2004. "Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 953-962, December.
    3. H. Reiju Mihara, 2000. "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(3), pages 393-402.
    4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj & Sengupta, Kunal & Vohra, Rajiv, 1989. "A consistent bargaining set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 93-112, October.
    5. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
    6. Youngsub Chun, 2000. "Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(3), pages 507-521.
    7. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    8. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
    9. Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2004. "A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(2), pages 187-206, October.
    10. Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 1996. "Consistency, Replication Invariance, and Generalized Gini Bargaining Solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 367-386, May.
    11. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    12. Ergin, Haluk I., 2000. "Consistency in house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-97, August.
    13. Thomson, William, 1994. "Consistent extensions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 35-49, August.
    14. Semih Koray & Bulent Unel, 2003. "Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 495-507, June.
    15. Lensberg, Terje, 1987. "Stability and Collective Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 935-961, July.
    16. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 469-499, December.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Paula Jaramillo, 2017. "Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 177-195, January.
    3. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
    4. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    5. Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2012. "Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 185-197.
    6. Ipek Gursel Tapki, 2016. "Population Monotonicity in Public Good Economies with Single Dipped Preferences," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(4), pages 80-83, April.

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