IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v132y2024icp75-78.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Very weakly dominant strategies

Author

Listed:
  • Bachi, Benjamin
  • Rachmilevitch, Shiran

Abstract

We introduce a new solution concept for n-person strategic games — very weak dominance — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.

Suggested Citation

  • Bachi, Benjamin & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2024. "Very weakly dominant strategies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 75-78.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:132:y:2024:i:c:p:75-78
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000878
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shengwu Li, 2017. "Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3257-3287, November.
    2. Emin Karagözoğlu & Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2018. "Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 495-508, October.
    3. Fey, Mark, 2012. "Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 424-427.
    4. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2020. "An implementation of the Nash bargaining solution by iterated strict dominance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    5. Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2013. "A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 422-430.
    6. Nejat Anbarci, 2001. "Divide-the-Dollar Game Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 295-303, June.
    7. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2023. "Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria: examples with continuous payoff functions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 65-68, April.
    8. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud, 2024. "Beyond dominance and Nash: Ranking equilibria by critical mass," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 378-394.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Reasonable Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 319-330, September.
    2. Atakan Dizarlar & Emin Karagözoğlu, 2023. "Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 867-891, August.
    3. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "(In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 175-193, March.
    4. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    5. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    6. Evan Piermont, 2021. "Hypothetical Expected Utility," Papers 2106.15979, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    7. Wei He & Jiangtao Li & Weijie Zhong, 2024. "Rank-Guaranteed Auctions," Papers 2408.12001, arXiv.org.
    8. Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2021. "Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 650-668, June.
    9. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    10. Josué Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2022. "Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 969-988, November.
    11. Troyan, Peter, 2024. "(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    12. Markus Möller, 2024. "Transparent Matching Mechanisms," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 306, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    13. Moser, Johannes, 2018. "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181506, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Breitmoser, Yves & Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2019. "Obviousness around the clock," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    15. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2022. "Cost of complexity in implementing the Shapley value by choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure," ISER Discussion Paper 1176, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    16. Takashi Kamihigashi & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2021. "Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 289-312, October.
    17. Kevin Leyton-Brown & Paul Milgrom & Neil Newman & Ilya Segal, 2024. "Artificial Intelligence and Market Design: Lessons Learned from Radio Spectrum Reallocation," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Breitmoser, Yves, 2019. "Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 423-447.
    19. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2023. "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    20. Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2019. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2003-2035, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dominant strategies; Solution concepts;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:132:y:2024:i:c:p:75-78. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.