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How to Control Controlled School Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Echenique
  • M. Bumin Yenmez

Abstract

We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools' preferences for diversity. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations. We also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed. (JEL D47, H75, I21, I28)

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Echenique & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2015. "How to Control Controlled School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2679-2694, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:8:p:2679-94
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130929
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
    2. Kominers, Scott Duke & Sönmez, Tayfun, 2016. "Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    3. Scott Duke Kominers & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "Designing for Diversity: Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 806, Boston College Department of Economics.
    4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
    5. Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice," NBER Working Papers 18981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Christopher P. Chambers & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2017. "Choice and Matching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 126-147, August.
    7. Orhan Ayg?n & Tayfun S?nmez, 2013. "Matching with Contracts: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 2050-2051, August.
    8. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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