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A separation result for stationary preferences

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  • Kochov, Asen

Abstract

A group of n>1 agents have distinct stationary preferences on a space of consumption streams. Is there a single choice problem from which each agent has a unique and distinct optimum? That is, can one differentiate among the agents by asking them to make a single choice? This paper shows that the answer is yes.

Suggested Citation

  • Kochov, Asen, 2017. "A separation result for stationary preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 123-126.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:123-126
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-948, July.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1977. "The St. Petersburg paradox: A discussion of some recent comments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 443-445, April.
    3. Asen Kochov, 2015. "Time and No Lotteries: An Axiomatization of Maxmin Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 239-262, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bommier, Antoine & Kochov, Asen & Le Grand, François, 2019. "Ambiguity and endogenous discounting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 48-62.
    2. Asen Kochov & Yangwei Song, 2023. "Intertemporal Hedging and Trade in Repeated Games With Recursive Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(6), pages 2333-2369, November.

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