A separation result for stationary preferences
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.008
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- Asen Kochov & Yangwei Song, 2023.
"Intertemporal Hedging and Trade in Repeated Games With Recursive Utility,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(6), pages 2333-2369, November.
- Kochov, Asen & Song, Yangwei, 2022. "Intertemporal Hedging and Trade in Repeated Games with Recursive Utility," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 361, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
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Keywords
Intertemporal choice; Stationary preferences; Payoff asymmetry;All these keywords.
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