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On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

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  • van den Brink, René
  • Pintér, Miklós

Abstract

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. It turns out that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games. However, when considering an assignment game as a (communication) graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph where buyers (sellers) are connected with sellers (buyers) only, we show that Myerson’s component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket, where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount.

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  • van den Brink, René & Pintér, Miklós, 2015. "On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 110-114.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:60:y:2015:i:c:p:110-114
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.016
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    Cited by:

    1. Trudeau, Christian, 2018. "From the bankruptcy problem and its Concede-and-Divide solution to the assignment problem and its Fair Division solution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 225-238.
    2. Csató, László, 2013. "Rangsorolás páros összehasonlításokkal. Kiegészítések a felvételizői preferencia-sorrendek módszertanához [Paired comparisons ranking. A supplement to the methodology of application-based preferenc," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1333-1353.
    3. Rene (J.R.) van den Brink & Osman Palanci & S. Zeynep Alparslan Gok, 2017. "Interval Solutions for Tu-games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-094/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. van den Brink, René & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2022. "The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 299(3), pages 1033-1044.
    5. Encarnacion Algaba & Rene van den Brink, 2021. "Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-019/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. van den Brink, René & Núñez, Marina & Robles, Francisco, 2021. "Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    7. R. Branzei & E. Gutiérrez & N. Llorca & J. Sánchez-Soriano, 2021. "Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 17-40, June.
    8. J. Schouten & B. Dietzenbacher & P. Borm, 2022. "The nucleolus and inheritance of properties in communication situations," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1117-1135, November.
    9. Csató, László, 2019. "A characterization of the Logarithmic Least Squares Method," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 276(1), pages 212-216.
    10. McQuillin, Ben & Sugden, Robert, 2018. "Balanced externalities and the Shapley value," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 81-92.
    11. Francesc Llerena & Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels, 2015. "An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 1-15, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; Assignment game; Shapley value; Graph game; Submarket efficiency; Valuation fairness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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