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Price collusion and deregulation in the Japanese retail gasoline market

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  • Goto, Ujo
  • McKenzie, C.R.

Abstract

This paper estimates models for the retail price of gasoline in Tokyo and Osaka based on recent game theory emphasizing the importance of forward-looking behaviour by firms. Using monthly data for the 1990s, this paper presents evidence consistent with the theory that future changes in the economic environment firms face do have an impact on the current retail price of gasoline. Some evidence is also presented that suggests the behaviour of retail prices has changed over the time period being examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Goto, Ujo & McKenzie, C.R., 2002. "Price collusion and deregulation in the Japanese retail gasoline market," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 187-195.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matcom:v:59:y:2002:i:1:p:187-195
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Severin Boreinstein & Andrea Shepard, 1996. "Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 429-451, Autumn.
    3. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
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    6. Newey, Whitney & West, Kenneth, 2014. "A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 33(1), pages 125-132.
    7. Colin McKenzie & Michael McAleer, 1997. "On Efficient Estimation and Correct Inference in Models with Generated Regressors: a General Approach," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 48(4), pages 368-389, December.
    8. Pagan, Adrian, 1984. "Econometric Issues in the Analysis of Regressions with Generated Regressors," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 221-247, February.
    9. Pesaran, M Hashem & Smith, Richard J, 1994. "A Generalized R[superscript]2 Criterion for Regression Models Estimated by the Instrumental Variables Method," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 705-710, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ujo Goto, 2005. "A test of the credibility of temporary protection: evidence from the Japanese oil industry," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 119-123.

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