IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/marpol/v63y2016icp1-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fishing in deep waters: The development of a deep-sea fishing coastal fleet in Norway

Author

Listed:
  • Standal, Dag
  • Sønvisen, Signe Annie
  • Asche, Frank

Abstract

In the post-war political landscape in Norway, it has been a rooted consensus to maintain the coastal fleet as the largest and most important segment of the Norwegian fishing fleet. The simple and open technology, and low entrance costs in the coastal fisheries have secured employment in fisheries dependent districts, especially in Northern Norway. In order to protect the coastal fleet from the deep-sea fleet, the regime fixed the resource allocation and secured the coastal vessels with the largest share of the national TAC for cod. However, despite the strong institutionalization of the coastal fleet, the regime has not managed to avoid a rapid growth of deep-sea vessels and reallocation of quotas within the coastal group.

Suggested Citation

  • Standal, Dag & Sønvisen, Signe Annie & Asche, Frank, 2016. "Fishing in deep waters: The development of a deep-sea fishing coastal fleet in Norway," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:63:y:2016:i:c:p:1-7
    DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2015.09.017
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X15002687
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.09.017?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Standal, Dag & Aarset, Bernt, 2002. "The tragedy of soft choices: capacity accumulation and lopsided allocation in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 221-230, May.
    2. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Kailin Kroetz & James N. Sanchirico & Daniel K. Lew, 2015. "Efficiency Costs of Social Objectives in Tradable Permit Programs," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(3), pages 339-366.
    4. Martin D. Smith, 2012. "The New Fisheries Economics: Incentives Across Many Margins," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 379-402, August.
    5. Standal, Dag & Hersoug, Bjørn, 2014. "Back to square one? Fisheries allocation under pressure," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 236-245.
    6. Asche, Frank & Eggert, Håkan & Gudmundsson, Eyjolfur & Hoff, Ayoe & Pascoe, Sean, 2008. "Fisher's behaviour with individual vessel quotas--Over-capacity and potential rent: Five case studies," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 920-927, November.
    7. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January.
    8. Frank Asche & Trond Bjørndal & Daniel V. Gordon, 2009. "Resource Rent in Individual Quota Fisheries," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 85(2), pages 279-291.
    9. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
    10. Asche, Frank & Bjørndal, Marianne Tranberg & Bjørndal, Trond, 2014. "Development in fleet fishing capacity in rights based fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 166-171.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pettersen, Ingrid Kristine & Brækkan, Eivind Hestvik & Myrland, Øystein, 2018. "Are Norwegian fishermen selling in the same market?," Journal of Commodity Markets, Elsevier, vol. 12(C), pages 9-18.
    2. Frank Asche & Andreea L. Cojocaru & Ruth B. M. Pincinato & Kristin H. Roll, 2020. "Production Risk in the Norwegian Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 75(1), pages 137-149, January.
    3. H. Spencer Banzhaf & Yaqin Liu & Martin Smith & Frank Asche, 2019. "Non-Parametric Tests of the Tragedy of the Commons," NBER Working Papers 26398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Asche, Frank & Cojocaru, Andreea L. & Gaasland, Ivar & Straume, Hans-Martin, 2018. "Cod stories: Trade dynamics and duration for Norwegian cod exports," Journal of Commodity Markets, Elsevier, vol. 12(C), pages 71-79.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Standal, Dag & Annie Sønvisen, Signe, 2015. "Gear liberalization in the Northeast Arctic cod fisheries – Implications for sustainability, efficiency and legitimacy," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 141-148.
    2. Anna M. Birkenbach & Andreea L. Cojocaru & Frank Asche & Atle G. Guttormsen & Martin D. Smith, 2020. "Seasonal Harvest Patterns in Multispecies Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 75(3), pages 631-655, March.
    3. Asche, Frank & Smith, Martin D., 2010. "Trade and fisheries: Key issues for the World Trade Organization," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2010-03, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    4. Shamshak, Gina Louise & King, Jonathan R., 2015. "From cannery to culinary luxury: The evolution of the global geoduck market," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 81-89.
    5. Atle Oglend & Vesa-Heikki Soini, 2020. "Implications of Entry Restrictions to Address Externalities in Aquaculture: The Case of Salmon Aquaculture," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(4), pages 673-694, December.
    6. Tarui, Nori & Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen & Ellis, Greg, 2008. "Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 37-51, January.
    7. Berck, Peter & Costello, Christopher, 2000. "Overharvesting the traditional fishery with a captured regulator," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt94t2p8qq, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    8. Akihito Asano & Kelly Neill & Satoshi Yamazaki, 2016. "Decomposing Fishing Effort: Modelling The Sources Of Inefficiency In A Limited-Entry Fishery," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 16-23, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    9. Naoto Jinji, 2011. "Fisheries Subsidies and Management in Open Economies," Discussion papers e-11-004, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
    10. Gardner Brown, 2000. "Renewable Natural Resource Management and Use Without Markets," Working Papers 0025, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    11. Martinet, Vincent & Thebaud, Olivier & Doyen, Luc, 2007. "Defining viable recovery paths toward sustainable fisheries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 411-422, December.
    12. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 2000. "Market Rent Dissipation In Regulated Open Access Fisheries," 2000 Annual meeting, July 30-August 2, Tampa, FL 21878, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    13. Sethi, Gautam & Costello, Christopher & Fisher, Anthony & Hanemann, Michael & Karp, Larry, 2005. "Fishery management under multiple uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 300-318, September.
    14. Z. Y. Zhang & M. Sato, 2024. "Conjunctive surface water and groundwater management in a multiple user environment," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 26(4), pages 803-841, October.
    15. Manning, Dale T. & Uchida, Hirotsugu, 2014. "Are Two Rents Better than None? When Monopoly Harvester Co-ops are Preferred to a Rent Dissipated Resource Sector," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 171628, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    16. Bulte, Erwin H., 2003. "Open access harvesting of wildlife: the poaching pit and conservation of endangered species," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 27-37, January.
    17. Berck, Peter & Costello, Christopher, 2000. "Overharvesting the traditional fishery with a captured regulator," CUDARE Working Papers 43915, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    18. Stephanie McWhinnie & Kofi Otumawu-Apreku, 2013. "The Role of Fixed Cost and Non-Discretionary Variables in Fisheries: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-14, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    19. Phoebe Koundouri & Marita Laukkanen, 2004. "Stochastic Production in a Regulated Fishery:The Importance of Risk Considerations," DEOS Working Papers 0403, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    20. Deacon, Robert T. & Finnoff, David & Tschirhart, John, 2011. "Restricted capacity and rent dissipation in a regulated open access fishery," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 366-380, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:63:y:2016:i:c:p:1-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.