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Using a signal detection safety model to simulate managerial expectations and supervisory feedback

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  • Barkan, Rachel

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  • Barkan, Rachel, 2002. "Using a signal detection safety model to simulate managerial expectations and supervisory feedback," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 1005-1031, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:89:y:2002:i:2:p:1005-1031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
    2. Barkan, Rachel & Zohar, Dov & Erev, Ido, 1998. "Accidents and Decision Making under Uncertainty: A Comparison of Four Models," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 118-144, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schurr, Amos & Rodensky, Dotan & Erev, Ido, 2014. "The effect of unpleasant experiences on evaluation and behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 1-9.

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