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Competitiveness and environmental policies in a dynamic model

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  • Stähler, Frank

Abstract

This paper discusses the issue of competitiveness and environmental regulation in a dynamic framework. It presents an example and a general model. It is shown that the dynamic framework cannot lend general support to the hypothesis that strict environmental policies result in an increase in competitiveness. Instead, the paper shows that the dynamization of the model adds further ambiguity to the results of the static models as they were discussed in Stahler (1998).

Suggested Citation

  • Stähler, Frank, 1998. "Competitiveness and environmental policies in a dynamic model," Kiel Working Papers 859, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:859
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/46828/1/258227192.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stähler, Frank, 1998. "Competitiveness and environmental policies in strategic environmental policy models," Kiel Working Papers 858, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Dutta Prajit K., 1995. "Collusion, Discounting and Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 289-306, June.
    4. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    5. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1984. "Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R&D," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 61-66, May.
    6. Scholz, Christian M., 1998. "Environmental regulation and its impact on welfare and international competitiveness in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework," Kiel Working Papers 857, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rothfels, Jacqueline, 2000. "Environmental policy under product differentiation and asymmetric costs - Does Leapfrogging occur and is it worth it?," IWH Discussion Papers 124/2000, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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