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Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version

Author

Listed:
  • George J. Mailath

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Larry Samuelson

    (Department of Economics, Yale University)

Abstract

This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.

Suggested Citation

  • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 11 Aug 2013.
    • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:13-044
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    File URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/13-044.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Boudreau, Laura & Heath, Rachel & McCormick, Tyler H., 2024. "Migrants, experience, and working conditions in Bangladeshi garment factories," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 196-213.
    2. Zago, Angelo, 2015. "La réputation collective sur les marchés agricoles," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 345(January-F).
    3. Samuelson, Larry & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2017. "Even up: Maintaining relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 170-217.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    commitment; incomplete information; reputation bound; reputation effects; long-run relationships; reputations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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