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Limits to rational learning

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  • Levy, Yehuda John

Abstract

A long-standing open question raised in the seminal paper of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) is whether or not the play of a repeated game, in the rational learning model introduced there, must eventually resemble the play of exact equilibria, and not just the play of approximate equilibria as demonstrated there. This paper shows that play may remain distant – in fact, mutually singular – from the play of any equilibrium of the repeated game. We further show that the same inaccessibility holds in Bayesian games, where the play of a Bayesian equilibrium may continue to remain distant from the play of any equilibrium of the true game.

Suggested Citation

  • Levy, Yehuda John, 2015. "Limits to rational learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 1-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:160:y:2015:i:c:p:1-23
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.001
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    1. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2022. "The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 142-152.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rational learning; Repeated games; Nash equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools

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