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Excess payoff dynamics in games

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  • Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
  • Hofbauer, Josef

Abstract

We present the family of Excess Payoff Dynamics for normal-form games, where the growth of a strategy depends only on its current proportion and the excess payoff, i.e., the payoff advantage of the strategy over the average population payoff. Requiring dependence only on the own excess payoff and a natural sign-preserving condition, the class essentially reduces to aggregate monotonic dynamics, a functional generalization of the Replicator Dynamics. However, Excess Payoff Dynamics also include a different subclass which contains the Replicator Dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics, and other interesting examples as, e.g., satisficing dynamics. We also clarify the relation to excess demand dynamics from microeconomics.

Suggested Citation

  • Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Hofbauer, Josef, 2022. "Excess payoff dynamics in games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:204:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000540
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105464
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Excess payoff; Evolutionary dynamics; BNN dynamics; Excess demand;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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