IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v145y2010i6p2471-2482.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Selectivity in hierarchical social systems

Author

Listed:
  • Garcia-Martinez, Jose A.

Abstract

We consider a selection process and a hierarchical institution in a dynamic model as in Harrington (1998) [4], where agents are "climbing the pyramid" in a rank-order contest based on the "up or out" policy. Agents are matched in pairs to compete, and each pair faces a particular environment. They are ranked according to the quality of their performances in this particular environment, and a fraction of the highest ranked agents are promoted. The size of this fraction characterizes the selectivity of the process, and we distinguish between local and global selectivity. We study the role of the degree of selectivity in the dynamic process where types of agent differ in their expected performances. Surprisingly, we find that an increase in the selectivity of the process can be detrimental to the agents with the highest expected performances and can increase the survivability of the lesser performing. However, if the selectivity decreases, the only survivor is the agent with the highest expected performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Garcia-Martinez, Jose A., 2010. "Selectivity in hierarchical social systems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2471-2482, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2471-2482
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(10)00139-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 2000. "Progressive ambition, electoral selection, and the creation of ideologues," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 13-23, March.
    3. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1999. "The Equilibrium Level of Rigidity in a Hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 189-202, August.
    4. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos, 1999. "Dynamical Systems with a Continuum of Randomly Matched Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 245-267, June.
    5. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
    6. Joseph E. Harrington & Jr., 1999. "Rigidity of Social Systems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 40-64, February.
    7. Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2000. "Unfolding Social Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 177-203, February.
    8. Hvide, Hans K. & Kristiansen, Eirik G., 2003. "Risk taking in selection contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 172-179, January.
    9. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1998. "The Social Selection of Flexible and Rigid Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 63-82, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Garcia-Martinez, Jose A., 2012. "An Unexpected Role of Local Selectivity in Social Promotion," MPRA Paper 36324, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. José A. García-Martínez, 2018. "A simple dynamic contest with a parameterized strength of competition," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 305-332, August.
    3. Jiabin Wu, 2017. "Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(04), pages 1-16, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. José A. García-Martínez, 2018. "A simple dynamic contest with a parameterized strength of competition," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 305-332, August.
    2. Garcia-Martinez, Jose A., 2012. "An Unexpected Role of Local Selectivity in Social Promotion," MPRA Paper 36324, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jose A. Garcia-Martinez, 2010. "The Role of Selectivity in Hierarchical Social Systems," Working Papers 2010-05, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    4. José A. García Martínez, 2005. "Selection And Efficiency In Hierarchical Social Systems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-35, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    5. Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
    6. Anja Schöttner & Veikko Thiele, 2010. "Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 699-731, September.
    7. Konrad, Kai A., 2014. "Search duplication in research and design spaces — Exploring the role of local competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 222-228.
    8. Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 118, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    9. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Are 18 Holes Enough for Tiger Woods?," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 267-284, July.
    10. Mueller-Langer Frank & Andreoli-Versbach Patrick, 2017. "Leading-Effect, Risk-Taking and Sabotage in Two-Stage Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 237(1), pages 1-28, February.
    11. Jose Apesteguia & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2010. "Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2548-2564, December.
    12. Jennifer Brown & Dylan B. Minor, 2014. "Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 3087-3102, December.
    13. Gürtler, Oliver, 2005. "Are 18 holes enough for Tiger Woods?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 44, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    14. Connolly Robert A. & Rendleman Richard J., 2011. "Going for the Green: A Simulation Study of Qualifying Success Probabilities in Professional Golf," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 7(4), pages 1-50, October.
    15. Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2010. "Contests With Stochastic Abilities," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(1), pages 89-103, January.
    16. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 2020. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    17. Anil Gaba & Ilia Tsetlin & Robert L. Winkler, 2004. "Modifying Variability and Correlations in Winner-Take-All Contests," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 52(3), pages 384-395, June.
    18. Tom Coupé & Valérie Smeets & Frédéric Warzynski, 2006. "Incentives, Sorting and Productivity along the Career: Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 137-167, April.
    19. Lackner, Mario & Stracke, Rudi & Sunde, Uwe & Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf, 2015. "Are Competitors Forward Looking in Strategic Interactions? Evidence from the Field," Economics Series 319, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    20. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2471-2482. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.