Trade with Endogenous Market Power Under Asymmetric and Incomplete Information
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DOI: 10.1007/s10842-016-0217-0
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- Xinyi Xie & Liming Ying & Xue Cui, 2022. "Price Strategy Analysis of Electricity Retailers Based on Evolutionary Game on Complex Networks," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-17, August.
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More about this item
Keywords
D4 market structure and pricing; L1 market structure; firm strategy; and market performance; D8 information; knowledge; and uncertainty; C7 game theory and bargaining theory;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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