IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jebusi/v103y2019icp38-60.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do fiscal communication and clarity of fiscal announcements affect public debt uncertainty? Evidence from Brazil

Author

Listed:
  • Montes, Gabriel Caldas
  • Nicolay, Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca
  • Acar, Tatiana

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal communication and clarity of announcements about fiscal policy on public debt uncertainty. Using different econometric techniques (OLS, GMM and Quantile Regressions), the results indicate that the provision of more information through communication must be accompanied by improvements in the clarity of the announcements released. Thus, our findings reveal that as clarity of fiscal announcements increases, the stronger is the effect of improvements in communication from fiscal authority in reducing public debt uncertainty; and this effect is even stronger when public debt uncertainty is higher.

Suggested Citation

  • Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Nicolay, Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca & Acar, Tatiana, 2019. "Do fiscal communication and clarity of fiscal announcements affect public debt uncertainty? Evidence from Brazil," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 38-60.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:103:y:2019:i:c:p:38-60
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2018.12.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148619518301516
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2018.12.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hansen, Lars Peter, 1982. "Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1054, July.
    2. Juan Camilo Galvis Ciro & Helder Ferreira de Mendonça, 2017. "Effect of credibility and reputation on discretionary fiscal policy: empirical evidence from Colombia," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1529-1552, December.
    3. Damjan Pfajfar & Emiliano Santoro, 2013. "News on Inflation and the Epidemiology of Inflation Expectations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(6), pages 1045-1067, September.
    4. Carlos Capistr¡N & Allan Timmermann, 2009. "Disagreement and Biases in Inflation Expectations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 365-396, March.
    5. Aleš Bulíř & Martin Čihák & David-Jan Jansen, 2013. "What Drives Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 125-145, February.
    6. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    7. Jonas Dovern & Ulrich Fritsche & Jiri Slacalek, 2012. "Disagreement Among Forecasters in G7 Countries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 1081-1096, November.
    8. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
    9. Jansen, David-Jan, 2011. "Mumbling with great incoherence: Was it really so difficult to understand Alan Greenspan?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 70-72, October.
    10. Huixin Bi & Eric M. Leeper & Campbell Leith, 2013. "Uncertain Fiscal Consolidations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 0, pages 31-63, February.
    11. António Afonso & Luca Agnello & Davide Furceri, 2010. "Fiscal policy responsiveness, persistence, and discretion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 503-530, December.
    12. David-Jan Jansen & Richhild Moessner, 2016. "Communicating dissent on monetary policy: Evidence from central bank minutes," DNB Working Papers 512, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    13. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov, 2003. "The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1419-1447.
    14. Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2009. "Debt Maturity: Is Long‐Term Debt Optimal?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 890-905, November.
    15. Allard, Julien & Catenaro, Marco & Vidal, Jean-Pierre & Wolswijk, Guido, 2013. "Central bank communication on fiscal policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 1-14.
    16. Bomberger, William A, 1996. "Disagreement as a Measure of Uncertainty," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(3), pages 381-392, August.
    17. de Mendonça, Helder Ferreira & de Guimarães e Souza, Gustavo José, 2009. "Inflation targeting credibility and reputation: The consequences for the interest rate," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1228-1238, November.
    18. Lars E. O. Svensson, 1999. "How should monetary policy be conducted in an era of price stability?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 195-259.
    19. Helder Ferreira de Mendonça & Gabriela Elise Auel, 2016. "The effect of monetary and fiscal credibility on public debt: empirical evidence from the Brazilian economy," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(11), pages 816-821, July.
    20. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Luna, Paulo Henrique, 2018. "Discretionary fiscal policy and disagreement in expectations about fiscal variables empirical evidence from Brazil," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 100-116.
    22. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2015. "Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2644-2678, August.
    23. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Mark P. Taylor, 1992. "Testing for Credibility Effects," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(3), pages 545-571, September.
    24. Wu, De-Min, 1973. "Alternative Tests of Independence Between Stochastic Regressors and Disturbances," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 733-750, July.
    25. G. C. Montes & R. T. F. Nicolay, 2017. "Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(32), pages 3163-3180, July.
    26. Gianna Boero & Jeremy Smith & KennethF. Wallis, 2008. "Uncertainty and Disagreement in Economic Prediction: The Bank of England Survey of External Forecasters," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(530), pages 1107-1127, July.
    27. Paul Söderlind, 2011. "Inflation Risk Premia and Survey Evidence on Macroeconomic Uncertainty," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7(2), pages 113-133, June.
    28. G. C. Montes & L. V. Oliveira & A. Curi & R. T. F. Nicolay, 2016. "Effects of transparency, monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(7), pages 590-607, February.
    29. Michael Ehrmann & Sylvester Eijffinger & Marcel Fratzscher, 2012. "The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 1018-1052, September.
    30. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
    31. Koenker, Roger W & Bassett, Gilbert, Jr, 1978. "Regression Quantiles," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 33-50, January.
    32. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis & Justin Wolfers, 2004. "Disagreement about Inflation Expectations," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Volume 18, pages 209-270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    33. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Curi, Alexandre, 2017. "Disagreement in expectations about public debt, monetary policy credibility and inflation risk premium," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 46-61.
    34. Newey, Whitney & West, Kenneth, 2014. "A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 33(1), pages 125-132.
    35. Hendry, David F., 2001. "Achievements and challenges in econometric methodology," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 7-10, January.
    36. Ricco, Giovanni & Callegari, Giovanni & Cimadomo, Jacopo, 2016. "Signals from the government: Policy disagreement and the transmission of fiscal shocks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 107-118.
    37. Helder de Mendonca, 2007. "Towards credibility from inflation targeting: the Brazilian experience," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(20), pages 2599-2615.
    38. Bollerslev, Tim, 1986. "Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 307-327, April.
    39. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1993. "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195060119.
    40. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    41. Stefano Eusepi & Richard Crump & Emanuel Moench & Philippe Andrade, 2014. "Noisy Information and Fundamental Disagreement," 2014 Meeting Papers 797, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    42. Patton, Andrew J. & Timmermann, Allan, 2010. "Why do forecasters disagree? Lessons from the term structure of cross-sectional dispersion," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(7), pages 803-820, October.
    43. de Mendonça, Helder Ferreira & Nicolay, Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca, 2017. "Is communication clarity from fiscal authority useful? Evidence from an emerging economy," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 35-51.
    44. Engle, Robert F, 1982. "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 987-1007, July.
    45. David‐Jan Jansen, 2011. "Does The Clarity Of Central Bank Communication Affect Volatility In Financial Markets? Evidence From Humphrey‐Hawkins Testimonies," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(4), pages 494-509, October.
    46. Andrade, Philippe & Crump, Richard K. & Eusepi, Stefano & Moench, Emanuel, 2016. "Fundamental disagreement," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 106-128.
    47. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    48. de Mendonça, Helder Ferreira & Machado, Marcelo Rangel, 2013. "Public debt management and credibility: Evidence from an emerging economy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 10-21.
    49. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Tatiana Acar, 2018. "Fiscal credibility and disagreement in expectations about inflation: evidence for Brazil," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 826-843.
    50. Cragg, John G, 1983. "More Efficient Estimation in the Presence of Heteroscedasticity of Unknown Form," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(3), pages 751-763, May.
    51. Mr. Marcos Poplawski Ribeiro & Jan-Christoph Rülke, 2011. "Fiscal Expectations Under the Stability and Growth Pact: Evidence from Survey Data," IMF Working Papers 2011/048, International Monetary Fund.
    52. Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 25-51, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Paulo henrique Luna, 2021. "Effects of discretionary fiscal policy and fiscal communication on fiscal credibility: Empirical evidence from Brazil," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(3), pages 1486-1500.
    2. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Victor Maia, 2023. "The reaction of disagreements in inflation expectations to fiscal sentiment obtained from information in official communiqués," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 828-859, October.
    3. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Nicolay, Rodolfo & Pereira, Flavio, 2022. "Does fiscal sentiment matter for sovereign risk?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 18-30.
    4. Juan Camilo Galvis-Ciro & Juan Camilo Anzoátegui-Zapata & Cristina Isabel Ramos-Barroso, 2022. "The Effect of Communication and Credibility on Fiscal Disagreement: Empirical Evidence from Colombia," Journal of Business Cycle Research, Springer;Centre for International Research on Economic Tendency Surveys (CIRET), vol. 18(3), pages 215-238, November.
    5. Juan Camilo Anzoátegui Zapata & Juan Camilo Galvis Ciro, 2022. "Efectos de la comunicación del banco central sobre el desacuerdo en las expectativas de la tasa de política monetaria: evidencias para Colombia," Revista Finanzas y Politica Economica, Universidad Católica de Colombia, vol. 14(2), pages 375-409, June.
    6. Bruno Ferreira Oliveira & Rodolfo Tomás Fonseca Nicolay, 2022. "Does innovative capacity affect the deindustrialization process? A panel data analysis," Journal of Economic Structures, Springer;Pan-Pacific Association of Input-Output Studies (PAPAIOS), vol. 11(1), pages 1-36, December.
    7. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Paulo Henrique Lourenço Luna, 2022. "Do fiscal opacity, fiscal impulse, and fiscal credibility affect disagreement about economic growth forecasts? Empirical evidence from Brazil considering the period of political instability and presid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 2356-2393, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Acar, Tatiana, 2020. "Fiscal credibility, target revisions and disagreement in expectations about fiscal results," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 38-58.
    2. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Paulo Henrique Lourenço Luna, 2022. "Do fiscal opacity, fiscal impulse, and fiscal credibility affect disagreement about economic growth forecasts? Empirical evidence from Brazil considering the period of political instability and presid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 2356-2393, November.
    3. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Luna, Paulo Henrique, 2018. "Discretionary fiscal policy and disagreement in expectations about fiscal variables empirical evidence from Brazil," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 100-116.
    4. G. C. Montes & R. T. F. Nicolay, 2017. "Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(32), pages 3163-3180, July.
    5. Juan Camilo Galvis-Ciro & Juan Camilo Anzoátegui-Zapata & Cristina Isabel Ramos-Barroso, 2022. "The Effect of Communication and Credibility on Fiscal Disagreement: Empirical Evidence from Colombia," Journal of Business Cycle Research, Springer;Centre for International Research on Economic Tendency Surveys (CIRET), vol. 18(3), pages 215-238, November.
    6. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Souza, Ivan, 2020. "Sovereign default risk, debt uncertainty and fiscal credibility: The case of Brazil," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    7. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Caio Ferrari Ferreira, 2019. "Does monetary policy credibility mitigate the effects of uncertainty about exchange rate on uncertainties about both inflation and interest rate?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 649-678, October.
    8. G. C. Montes & L. V. Oliveira & A. Curi & R. T. F. Nicolay, 2016. "Effects of transparency, monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(7), pages 590-607, February.
    9. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & de Hollanda Lima, Natalia Teixeira, 2022. "Discretionary fiscal policy, fiscal credibility and inflation risk premium," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 208-222.
    10. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Igor Mendes Marcelino, 2023. "Uncertainties and disagreements in expectations of professional forecasters: Evidence from an inflation targeting developing country," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(4), pages 937-956, July.
    11. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Victor Maia, 2023. "The reaction of disagreements in inflation expectations to fiscal sentiment obtained from information in official communiqués," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 828-859, October.
    12. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Tatiana Acar, 2018. "Fiscal credibility and disagreement in expectations about inflation: evidence for Brazil," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 826-843.
    13. Gabriel Caldas Montes & José Américo Pereira Antunes & Alexei Ferreira Araújo, 2021. "Effects of monetary policy and credibility on financial intermediation: evidence from the Brazilian banking sector," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 1191-1219, March.
    14. Gabriel C Montes & Caio F Ferreira, 2022. "Monetary policy opacity and disagreements in expectations about variables under central bank control," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 42(2), pages 703-721.
    15. Ruttachai Seelajaroen & Pornanong Budsaratragoon & Boonlert Jitmaneeroj, 2020. "Do monetary policy transparency and central bank communication reduce interest rate disagreement?," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(3), pages 368-393, April.
    16. Juan Camilo Galvis Ciro & Juan Camilo Anzoátegui Zapata, 2019. "Disagreement in inflation expectations: empirical evidence for Colombia," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(40), pages 4411-4424, August.
    17. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Curi, Alexandre, 2017. "Disagreement in expectations about public debt, monetary policy credibility and inflation risk premium," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 46-61.
    18. Ana Jordânia De Oliveira & Gabriel Caldas Montes & Rodolfo Nicolay, 2018. "Fiscal Credibility And Central Bank Credibility: How Do We Build Them? Empirical Evidence From Brazil," Anais do XLIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 44th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 43, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    19. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Nicolay, Rodolfo & Pereira, Flavio, 2022. "Does fiscal sentiment matter for sovereign risk?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 18-30.
    20. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca Nicolay, 2015. "Central bank’s perception on inflation and inflation expectations of experts," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 42(6), pages 1142-1158, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal communication; Clarity; Disagreement; Expectations; Public debt; Uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:103:y:2019:i:c:p:38-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-economics-and-business .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.