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Specialization and competition in marriage models

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  • Nosaka, Hiromi

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  • Nosaka, Hiromi, 2007. "Specialization and competition in marriage models," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 104-119, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:63:y:2007:i:1:p:104-119
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2001. "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 333-373, December.
    2. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2016. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(329), pages 172-200, January.
    3. Cole Harold Linh & Mailath George J. & Postlewaite Andrew, 2001. "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-34, March.
    4. Jeremy Greenwood & Ananth Seshadri & Mehmet Yorukoglu, 2005. "Engines of Liberation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(1), pages 109-133.
    5. Echevarria, Cristina & Merlo, Antonio, 1999. "Gender Differences in Education in a Dynamic Household Bargaining Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(2), pages 265-286, May.
    6. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June.
    7. Junichiro Ishida, 2003. "The Role of Intrahousehold Bargaining in Gender Discrimination," Rationality and Society, , vol. 15(3), pages 361-380, August.
    8. Hadfield, Gillian K., 1999. "A coordination model of the sexual division of labor," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 125-153, October.
    9. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2016. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(329), pages 172-200, 01.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Mariani, 2012. "The economic value of virtue," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 323-356, December.
    2. Philipp Otto & Friedel Bolle, 2011. "Matching markets with price bargaining," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 322-348, September.
    3. Casari, Marco & Lisciandra, Maurizio, 2015. "Gender Discrimination and Common Property Resources," IZA Discussion Papers 9601, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Wei-Bin ZHANG, 2014. "Gender Discrimination, Education and Economic Growth in a Generalized Uzawa-Lucas Two-Sector Model," Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business, West University of Timisoara, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 7(1), pages 1-34.
    5. Peters, Michael, 2007. "The pre-marital investment game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 186-213, November.
    6. Alessandro Tampieri, 2016. "Over-education and assortative matching in partnerships: a theoretical analysis," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 312-328, June.
    7. Tampieri, A., 2022. "The effects of educational assortative matching on job and marital satisfaction," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    8. Otto, Philipp E. & Bolle, Friedel, 2009. "Small numbers matching markets: Unstable and inefficient due to over-competition?," Discussion Papers 270, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    9. Fang He, 2013. "Changes in Sex Ratio and Female Marriage Timing: An Empirical Study," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2012-052, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
    10. Casari, Marco & Lisciandra, Maurizio, 2014. "Gender Discrimination and Common Property Resources: a Model," MPRA Paper 57712, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Bjerk, David, 2009. "Beauty vs. earnings: Gender differences in earnings and priorities over spousal characteristics in a matching model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 248-259, March.
    12. Tie-Ying Liu & Hsu-Ling Chang & Chi-Wei Su, 2017. "Why do People Get Married? An Inframarginal Perspective," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 1281-1295, February.
    13. Dekel, Eddie & Pauzner, Ady, 2011. "Job satisfaction and the wage gap," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275770, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.

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