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Contingent social utility in the prisoners' dilemma

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  • Gibbons, Robert
  • Boven, Leaf Van

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  • Gibbons, Robert & Boven, Leaf Van, 2001. "Contingent social utility in the prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-17, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:45:y:2001:i:1:p:1-17
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    6. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 1999. "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 106-134, February.
    7. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
    8. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    9. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
    10. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
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    12. Colin F. Camerer, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-188, Fall.
    13. Gary Charness, 1996. "Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation," Economics Working Papers 283, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 1997.
    14. Cameron, Lisa A, 1999. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
    15. Pillutla, Madan M. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1996. "Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 208-224, December.
    16. Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-219, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carin van der Cruijsen & Joris Knoben, 2018. "Ctrl+C Ctrl+pay: Do people mirror payment behaviour of their peers?," DNB Working Papers 611, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    2. Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Gjerstad, Steven, 2007. "A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-45, April.
    3. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model," Economics Working Papers 441, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2000.
    4. Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer & Yuval Rottenstreich & Marc Knez, 2001. "The Illusion of Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(5), pages 582-598, October.
    5. Jamison, Julian & Karlan, Dean & Schechter, Laura, 2008. "To deceive or not to deceive: The effect of deception on behavior in future laboratory experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 477-488, December.
    6. Carin Cruijsen & Joris Knoben, 2021. "Ctrl+C Ctrl+Pay: Do People Mirror Electronic Payment Behavior of their Peers?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 69-96, April.
    7. Van Boven, Leaf & Loewenstein, George & Dunning, David, 2003. "Mispredicting the endowment effect:: Underestimation of owners' selling prices by buyer's agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 351-365, July.
    8. Michał Krawczyk, 2013. "Delineating deception in experimental economics: Researchers' and subjects' views," Working Papers 2013-11, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    9. Green, Kesten C., 2002. "Forecasting decisions in conflict situations: a comparison of game theory, role-playing, and unaided judgement," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 321-344.

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