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Multi-task agency: a combinatorial model

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  • Bardsley, Peter

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  • Bardsley, Peter, 2001. "Multi-task agency: a combinatorial model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 233-248, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:44:y:2001:i:2:p:233-248
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    1. Richard E. Just & Wallace E. Huffman, 1992. "Economic Principles and Incentives: Structure, Management, and Funding of Agricultural Research in the United States," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1101-1108.
    2. Wallace E. Huffman & Richard E. Just, 1994. "Funding, Structure, and Management of Public Agricultural Research in the United States," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(4), pages 744-759.
    3. Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, 1974. "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 3, pages 54-75, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Meyer, Margaret A. & Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1996. "Limited intertemporal commitment and job design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 401-417, December.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    6. Slade, Margaret E, 1996. "Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 465-486, May.
    7. Donald M. Topkis, 1978. "Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 305-321, April.
    8. George W. Norton & Philip G. Pardey & Julian M. Alston, 1992. "Economic Issues in Agricultural Research Priority Setting," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1089-1094.
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    Cited by:

    1. Suraj Prasad, 2009. "Task assignments and incentives: generalists versus specialists," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 380-403, June.

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