IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v225y2024icp290-304.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The evolution of collective choice under majority rules

Author

Listed:
  • Okada, Akira
  • Sawa, Ryoji

Abstract

A collective choice (or opinion) supported by a majority of individuals is challenged recurrently by a new one in a society. We consider a long-run evolution of collective choice under majority rules by stochastic evolutionary game theory. The Condorcet winner is uniquely a long-run equilibrium for all (super-)majority rules. When the Condorcet winner does not exist, the long-run equilibria under all majority rules belong to the top cycle set. In a multidimensional choice problem where the top cycle set tends to become the whole policy space, a long-run equilibrium belongs to the min–max policy set if the core is non-empty. We show that stochastic evolutionary game theory can mitigate the indeterminacy problem in social choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Okada, Akira & Sawa, Ryoji, 2024. "The evolution of collective choice under majority rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 225(C), pages 290-304.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:225:y:2024:i:c:p:290-304
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.039
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002579
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.039?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:225:y:2024:i:c:p:290-304. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.