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Information about average evaluations spurs cooperation: An experiment on noisy reputation systems

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  • Greiff, Matthias
  • Paetzel, Fabian

Abstract

Reputation systems are an important part of many markets and online platforms. One central design choice that market designers face pertains to how much feedback to collect, and how to aggregate it. To explore this matter, we vary the design of reputation systems in the lab to evaluate how aggregation choices affect (i) evaluation behavior, (ii) expectations and (iii) rates of cooperation. We find that aggregation matters, even when disaggregated information is also available. Results show that with average evaluations, incentives for reputation building are stronger, evaluations are “more extreme”, expectations are more optimistic, and contributions are about 50% higher.

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  • Greiff, Matthias & Paetzel, Fabian, 2020. "Information about average evaluations spurs cooperation: An experiment on noisy reputation systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 334-356.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:180:y:2020:i:c:p:334-356
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.014
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    Cited by:

    1. Zehao Chen & Yanchen Zhu & Tianyang Shen & Yufan Ye, 2021. "Reputation dependent pricing strategy: analysis based on a Chinese C2C marketplace," Papers 2109.12477, arXiv.org.
    2. Figini, Paolo & Leoni, Veronica & Vici, Laura, 2024. "And suddenly, the rain! When surprises shape experienced utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 771-784.
    3. Krügel, Jan Philipp & Paetzel, Fabian, 2024. "The impact of fraud on reputation systems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 329-354.
    4. Krügel, Jan Philipp & Paetzel, Fabian, 2021. "The Impact of Fake Reviews on Reputation Systems and Efficiency," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242415, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Average evaluations; Reputation system; Expectations; Evaluation behavior; Endogenous evaluations; Informativeness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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