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Street-level responsiveness of city governments in China, Germany, and the United States

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  • Köhler, Ekkehard
  • Matsusaka, John G.
  • Wu, Yanhui

Abstract

This paper presents evidence from parallel field experiments in China, Germany, and the United States. We contacted the mayor's office in over 6,000 cities asking for information about starting a new business. Chinese and German cities responded to 36–37 percent of requests while American cities responded only to 22 percent of requests. American and German cities were more responsive to requests from citizens than foreigners; Chinese cities were more responsive to requests from men than women. Chinese cities were more responsive to requests about starting a construction than a green business, and when the mayor was up for promotion. These results shed light on bureaucratic responsiveness in autocracies and democracies and for top-down versus bottom-up policy making.

Suggested Citation

  • Köhler, Ekkehard & Matsusaka, John G. & Wu, Yanhui, 2023. "Street-level responsiveness of city governments in China, Germany, and the United States," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 640-652.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:51:y:2023:i:2:p:640-652
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2023.01.001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government responsiveness; Bureaucracy; State effectiveness; Comparative political system; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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