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Non-performance risk and transaction costs in laboratory forward and spot markets

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  • Yakunina, Alla V.
  • Menkhaus, Dale J.
  • Phillips, Owen R.
  • Esipov, Victor E.

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  • Yakunina, Alla V. & Menkhaus, Dale J. & Phillips, Owen R. & Esipov, Victor E., 2003. "Non-performance risk and transaction costs in laboratory forward and spot markets," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 257-274, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:31:y:2003:i:2:p:257-274
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Owen Phillips & Dale Menkhaus & Joseph Krogmeier, 2001. "Laboratory Behavior in Spot and Forward Auction Markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(3), pages 243-256, December.
    2. Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-1433, November.
    3. Hamish R. Gow & Johan F. M. Swinnen, 2001. "Private Enforcement Capital and Contract Enforcement in Transition Economies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(3), pages 686-690.
    4. Mestelman, Stuart & Welland, Douglas, 1987. "Advance production in oral double auction markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 43-48.
    5. Phillips, Owen R. & Menkhaus, Dale J. & Krogmeier, Joseph L., 2001. "Production-to-order or production-to-stock: the endogenous choice of institution in experimental auction markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 333-345, March.
    6. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    7. Al-Najjar, Nabil I, 1995. "Incomplete Contracts and the Governance of Complex Contractual Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 432-436, May.
    8. Charles N. Noussair & Charles R. Plott & Raymond G. Riezman, 2013. "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 17, pages 299-328, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Carlton, Dennis W., 1989. "The theory and the facts of how markets clear: Is industrial organization valuable for understanding macroeconomics?," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 909-946, Elsevier.
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