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Bargaining over beauty: The economics of contracts in Renaissance art markets

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  • Piano, Ennio Emanuele

    (Middle Tennessee State University)

  • Piano, Clara E.

Abstract

This paper argues that concerns over opportunism affected the content and structure of Renaissance art contracts. Building on insights from the economic analysis of contracts, we first show that opportunism threatened the relationship between buyer—the patron—and seller—the painter—in Renaissance Italy. We then test the effect of opportunism on the contracting process for paintings against a novel data set on the content and structure of ninety documents corresponding to as many commissions. Our results provide evidence that concerns over opportunism had a systematic effect on the trading parties’ choice of how much and what to include in the contract governing their ex-change.

Suggested Citation

  • Piano, Ennio Emanuele & Piano, Clara E., 2021. "Bargaining over beauty: The economics of contracts in Renaissance art markets," SocArXiv 9b6c5, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:9b6c5
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/9b6c5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ennio E. Piano & Tanner Hardy, 2022. "Rent seeking and the decline of the Florentine school," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 59-78, July.

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