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A szerződések teljesülése a magyar élelmiszerláncban
[Contract fulfilments in Hungarian food chains]

Author

Listed:
  • Fertő, Imre
  • Elek, Sándor
  • Bakucs, Lajos Zoltán
  • Forgács, Csaba

Abstract

A tanulmány célja, hogy azonosítsa azokat a tényezőket, amelyek befolyásolják az élelmiszer-gazdasági kis- és közepes vállalkozások szerződéseinek teljesülését a Közép-magyarországi régióban. Számításaink megerősítik Guo-Jolly [2008] eredményeit, amely szerint a szerződések tartalmi elemeinek kulcsszerepük van a szerződések teljesülésében. Továbbá a vállalatvezetői képességek, a vállalati és tranzakciós jellemzők szintén jelentős hatást gyakorolnak a szerződések teljesülésére. Érdekes módon az ágazatspecifikus jellemzőknek csak korlátozott szerepük van a szerződések teljesülésének magyarázatában. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: D2, Q13.

Suggested Citation

  • Fertő, Imre & Elek, Sándor & Bakucs, Lajos Zoltán & Forgács, Csaba, 2012. "A szerződések teljesülése a magyar élelmiszerláncban [Contract fulfilments in Hungarian food chains]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 63-73.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1286
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mike, Károly, 2016. "Merre vezessen a magyar kapitalizmus útja?. Látkép Ronald Coase világítótornyából [Which course for Hungary s capitalism?. A view from Ronald Coase s lighthouse]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 597-614.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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