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Courts And Contract Enforcement In Agricultural Transition - Theory And Evidence From Poland

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  • Beckmann, Volker
  • Boger, Silke

Abstract

The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition agriculture. We develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement that captures the boundary between contracts to be judged as court "enforceable" and "not-enforceable" and, simultaneously, identifies the threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis based on a survey of 306 Polish hog farmer conducted in 1999 strongly supports our model.

Suggested Citation

  • Beckmann, Volker & Boger, Silke, 2003. "Courts And Contract Enforcement In Agricultural Transition - Theory And Evidence From Poland," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22213, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea03:22213
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.22213
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. World Bank, 2005. "The Dynamics of Vertical Coordination in Agrifood Chains in Eastern Europe and Central Asia : Implications for Policy and World Bank Operations," World Bank Publications - Reports 8806, The World Bank Group.

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