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Agency and Self-Enforcing Contracts

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  • Tao, Zhigang
  • Zhu, Tian

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  • Tao, Zhigang & Zhu, Tian, 2000. "Agency and Self-Enforcing Contracts," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 80-94, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:28:y:2000:i:1:p:80-94
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
    2. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
    3. Clive Bull, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 147-159.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    5. Nee, Victor, 1998. "Norms and Networks in Economic and Organizational Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 85-89, May.
    6. Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
    7. Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1998. "Innovation and Bureaucracy Under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(1), pages 151-164.
    8. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1989. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 447-480, March.
    9. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    10. Klein, Benjamin & Murphy, Kevin M, 1997. "Vertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 415-420, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tao, Zhigang & Zhu, Tian, 2001. "An agency theory of transactions without contract enforcement: The case of China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-14.
    2. Tetsushi Sonobe & Keijiro Otsuka, 2004. "Productivity Effects of TVE Privatization: The Case Study of Garment and Metal-Casting Enterprises in the Greater Yangtze River Region," NBER Chapters, in: Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region, pages 231-247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jeff S. Johnson & Ravipreet S. Sohi, 2016. "Understanding and resolving major contractual breaches in buyer–seller relationships: a grounded theory approach," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 185-205, March.
    4. Xianbi Huang, 2008. "Guanxi networks and job searches in China's emerging labour market: a qualitative investigation," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 22(3), pages 467-484, September.

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