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Shares versus Residual Claimant Contracts: The Case of Chinese TVEs

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  • Hsiao, Cheng
  • Nugent, Jeffrey
  • Perrigne, Isabelle
  • Qiu, Jicheng

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  • Hsiao, Cheng & Nugent, Jeffrey & Perrigne, Isabelle & Qiu, Jicheng, 1998. "Shares versus Residual Claimant Contracts: The Case of Chinese TVEs," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 317-337, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:26:y:1998:i:2:p:317-337
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    1. Kung, James Kai-sing & Lin, Yi-min, 2007. "The Decline of Township-and-Village Enterprises in China's Economic Transition," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 569-584, April.
    2. Richard J. Volpe & Timothy A. Park & Fengxia Dong & Helen H. Jensen, 2016. "Somatic cell counts in dairy marketing: quantile regression for count data," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 43(2), pages 331-358.
    3. Chen, Hongyi & Rozelle, Scott, 1999. "Leaders, managers, and the organization of township and village enterprises in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 529-557, December.
    4. Sonobe, Tetsushi & Hu, Dinghuan & Otsuka, Keijiro, 2006. "Industrial development in the inland region of China: A case study of the motorcycle industry," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 818-838, December.
    5. Choe, Chongwoo & Yin, Xiangkang, 2000. "Contract management responsibility system and profit incentives in China's state-owned enterprises," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 98-112.
    6. Che, Jiahua, 2002. "Rent Seeking and Government Ownership of Firms: An Application to China's Township-Village Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 787-811, December.
    7. Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 1997. "Determinants of Land Tenure Contracts; Theory and Evidence from Rural India," Departmental Working Papers 199710, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    8. Jiahua Che, 2002. "From the Grabbing Hand to the Helping Hand: A Rent Seeking Model of China's Township-Village Enterprises," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-13, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    9. Tetsushi Sonobe & Keijiro Otsuka, 2004. "Productivity Effects of TVE Privatization: The Case Study of Garment and Metal-Casting Enterprises in the Greater Yangtze River Region," NBER Chapters, in: Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region, pages 231-247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Richard Volpe, 2014. "Supercenters, Unionized Labor, and Performance in Food Retail," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 325-355, April.
    11. Ananish Chaudhuri, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Contractual Choice in Tenancy," Departmental Working Papers 199711, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    12. Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 2001. "Tenant characteristics and the choice of tenurial contracts in rural India," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(2), pages 169-181.
    13. Qin, Zhong, 2011. "Models of trust-sharing in Chinese private enterprises," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1017-1029, May.
    14. Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Property Rights and the Nature of Chinese Collective Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 247-268, June.
    15. Minggao Shen & Jikun Huang & Linxiu Zhang & Scott Rozelle, 2010. "Financial reform and transition in China: a study of the evolution of banks in rural China," Agricultural Finance Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 70(3), pages 305-332, November.
    16. Sandeep Mohapatra & Rachael Goodhue & Scott Rozelle, 2008. "Incentive Complementarity in China’s Rural Enterprises," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 33(1), pages 63-79, August.
    17. Liu, Deqiang & Otsuka, Keijiro, 2004. "A Comparison of Management Incentives, Abilities, and Efficiency between SOEs and TVEs: The Case of the Iron and Steel Industry in China," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 759-780, July.
    18. Lu, Jiangyong & Tao, Zhigang & Yang, Zhi, 2010. "The costs and benefits of government control: Evidence from China's collectively-owned enterprises," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 282-292, June.

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