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Motivation toward financial incentive goals on construction projects

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  • Rose, Timothy
  • Manley, Karen

Abstract

Construction industry observers tout the use of financial incentives as promoters of motivation and commitment on projects. Yet, little empirical evidence exists concerning their effectiveness. What are the drivers of motivation on construction projects? The reasons that construction project participants are motivated to pursue voluntary incentive goals are examined through four Australian case studies. The results demonstrate the critical role played by project relationships and equitable contract conditions in promoting the effectiveness of financial incentives. In the context of a construction project, this study finds financial incentives to be less important to motivation and performance than relationship enhancement initiatives. This finding is unexpected and has implications for the design of project procurement strategies. These results suggest that if project clients ignore the importance of relationship quality between participants, the impact of any financial incentive will be compromised.

Suggested Citation

  • Rose, Timothy & Manley, Karen, 2011. "Motivation toward financial incentive goals on construction projects," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(7), pages 765-773, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:64:y:2011:i:7:p:765-773
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    2. Qianqian Shi & Jianbo Zhu & Marcel Hertogh & Zhaohan Sheng, 2018. "Incentive Mechanism of Prefabrication in Mega Projects with Reputational Concerns," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-16, April.
    3. Shi Chen & Hau Lee, 2017. "Incentive Alignment and Coordination of Project Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1011-1025, April.
    4. Rodríguez-Segura, Enrique & Ortiz-Marcos, Isabel & Romero, José Javier & Tafur-Segura, Javier, 2016. "Critical success factors in large projects in the aerospace and defense sectors," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(11), pages 5419-5425.
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    6. Oleksii Borysov, 2024. "Development of a regression model for effective labour management of an IT project," Technology audit and production reserves, PC TECHNOLOGY CENTER, vol. 5(2(79)), pages 29-38, October.
    7. Kunnathuvalappil Hariharan, Naveen, 2019. "Elements and success factors for an efficient budgeting," MPRA Paper 109507, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Phi-Hung Nguyen, 2023. "A Fully Completed Spherical Fuzzy Data-Driven Model for Analyzing Employee Satisfaction in Logistics Service Industry," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-34, May.
    9. Kerkhove, L.P. & Vanhoucke, M., 2016. "Incentive contract design for projects: The owner׳s perspective," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 93-114.
    10. Stare, Aljaz, 2012. "The impact of a project organisational culture and team rewarding on project performance," Journal of East European Management Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 17(1), pages 40-67.

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