IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/20845.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Estimating Management Practice Complementarity between Decentralization and Performance Pay

Author

Listed:
  • Bryan Hong
  • Lorenz Kueng
  • Mu-Jeung Yang

Abstract

The existence of complementarity across management practices has been proposed as one potential explanation for the persistence of firm-level productivity differences. However, thus far no conclusive population-level tests of the complementary joint adoption of management practices have been conducted. Using unique detailed data on internal organization, occupational composition, and firm performance for a nationally representative sample of firms in the Canadian economy, we exploit regional variation in income tax progression as an instrument for the adoption of performance pay. We find systematic evidence for the complementarity of performance pay and decentralization of decision-making from principals to employees. Furthermore, in response to the adoption of performance pay, we find a concentration of decision-making at the level of managerial employees, as opposed to a general movement towards more decentralization throughout the organization. Finally, we find that adoption of performance pay is related to other types of organizational restructuring, such as greater use of outsourcing, Total Quality Management, re-engineering, and a reduction in the number of layers in the hierarchy.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan Hong & Lorenz Kueng & Mu-Jeung Yang, 2015. "Estimating Management Practice Complementarity between Decentralization and Performance Pay," NBER Working Papers 20845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20845
    Note: EFG LS PE PR
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20845.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicholas Bloom & Luis Garicano & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2014. "The Distinct Effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 2859-2885, December.
    2. Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2007. "Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1351-1408.
    3. Enghin Atalay & Ali Horta?su & Chad Syverson, 2014. "Vertical Integration and Input Flows," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1120-1148, April.
    4. Sylvain Chassang, 2010. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 448-465, March.
    5. Van Reenen, John & Bloom, Nicholas & Brynjolfsson, Erik & Saporta-Eksten, Itay & Foster, Lucia & Patnaik, Megha & Jarmin, Ron, 2014. "IT and Management in America," CEPR Discussion Papers 9886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Arora, Ashish, 1996. "Testing for complementarities in reduced-form regressions: A note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 51-55, January.
    7. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1989. "Agency costs and innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 305-327, December.
    8. Tobias Kretschmer & Eugenio J. Miravete & Jose C. Pernias, 2012. "Competitive Pressure and the Adoption of Complementary Innovations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1540-1570, June.
    9. Daron Acemoglu & Ufuk Akcigit & Harun Alp & Nicholas Bloom & William Kerr, 2018. "Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(11), pages 3450-3491, November.
    10. Helmut Bester & Daniel Krähmer, 2008. "Delegation and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 664-682, September.
    11. Nicholas Bloom & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2010. "Does Product Market Competition Lead Firms to Decentralize?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 434-438, May.
    12. Robert Gibbons & Richard Holden & Michael Powell, 2012. "Organization and Information: Firms' Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1813-1841.
    13. Phillipe Aghion & Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2014. "Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 37-63.
    14. Charles I. Jones, 2011. "Intermediate Goods and Weak Links in the Theory of Economic Development," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 1-28, April.
    15. Jakobsson, Ulf, 1976. "On the measurement of the degree of progression," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1-2), pages 161-168.
    16. Timothy F. Bresnahan & Erik Brynjolfsson & Lorin M. Hitt, 2002. "Information Technology, Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 339-376.
    17. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    18. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    19. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    20. Mu-Jeung Yang & Lorenz Kueng & Bryan Hong, 2015. "Business Strategy and the Management of Firms," NBER Working Papers 20846, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Erzo G. J. Luttmer, 2007. "Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(3), pages 1103-1144.
    22. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June.
    23. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October.
    24. Jan W. Rivkin, 2000. "Imitation of Complex Strategies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(6), pages 824-844, June.
    25. Tor Jakob Klette & Samuel Kortum, 2004. "Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(5), pages 986-1018, October.
    26. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2005. "Fairness and Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 960-980, September.
    27. Chad Syverson, 2011. "What Determines Productivity?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 326-365, June.
    28. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
    29. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    30. Gentry, William M. & Hubbard, R. Glenn, 2004. "The effects of progressive income taxation on job turnover," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(11), pages 2301-2322, September.
    31. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2013_022 is not listed on IDEAS
    32. Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September.
    33. Michael Powell, 2019. "Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(1), pages 121-146, March.
    34. Athey, Susan. & Stern, Scott, 1969-, 1998. "An empirical framework for testing theories about complementarity in orgaziational design," Working papers WP 4022-98., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    35. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1995. "Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 179-208, April.
    36. Eric Van den Steen, 2010. "Disagreement and the Allocation of Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 385-426.
    37. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 511-528, June.
    38. Angrist, Joshua D, 2001. "Estimations of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Dummy Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice: Reply," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 19(1), pages 27-28, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Brahm & Jorge Tarziján, 2016. "Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between internal organization and vertical integration," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(12), pages 2481-2502, December.
    2. Catherine Buffington & Lucia Foster & Ron Jarmin & Scott Ohlmacher, 2016. "The Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS): An Overview," Working Papers 16-28, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    3. Erik Brynjolfsson & Kristina McElheran, 2016. "Data in Action: Data-Driven Decision Making in U.S. Manufacturing," Working Papers 16-06, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    4. Rasel, Fabienne, 2014. "Combining technology and work organization: An analysis of complementarity between IT and decentralization across firms of different size," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-071, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Zoltan Bakonyi & Balazs Murakozy, 2016. "Centralization of strategic decisions during the Great Recession: An empirical analysis of European manufacturing firms," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1617, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    6. Mu-Jeung Yang & Lorenz Kueng & Bryan Hong, 2015. "Business Strategy and the Management of Firms," NBER Working Papers 20846, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Theresa Thompson Chaudhry & Mahvish Faran, 2015. "Organization, Management, and Wage Practices in Pakistan’s Electrical Fan and Readymade Garment Sectors," Lahore Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics, vol. 20(Special E), pages 183-204, September.
    8. Lorenz Kueng & Mu-Jeung Yang & Bryan Hong, 2014. "Sources of Firm Life-Cycle Dynamics: Differentiating Size vs. Age Effects," NBER Working Papers 20621, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bryan Hong & Lorenz Kueng & Mu-Jeung Yang, 2019. "Complementarity of Performance Pay and Task Allocation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5152-5170, November.
    2. Mu-Jeung Yang & Lorenz Kueng & Bryan Hong, 2015. "Business Strategy and the Management of Firms," NBER Working Papers 20846, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bloom, Nicholas & Van Reenen, John, 2011. "Human Resource Management and Productivity," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 19, pages 1697-1767, Elsevier.
    4. Phillipe Aghion & Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2014. "Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 37-63.
    5. Hottenrott, Hanna & Rexhäuser, Sascha & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 2016. "Organisational change and the productivity effects of green technology adoption," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 172-194.
    6. Viete, Steffen & Erdsiek, Daniel, 2020. "Mobile Information Technologies and Firm Performance: The Role of Employee Autonomy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    7. Erik Brynjolfsson & Kristina McElheran, 2016. "Data in Action: Data-Driven Decision Making in U.S. Manufacturing," Working Papers 16-06, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    8. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
    9. Veugelers, Reinhilde & Hottenrott, Hanna & Rexhäuser, Sascha, 2012. "Green innovations and organisational change: making better use of environmental technology," CEPR Discussion Papers 9055, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Catherine Buffington & Lucia Foster & Ron Jarmin & Scott Ohlmacher, 2016. "The Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS): An Overview," Working Papers 16-28, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    11. Hideshi Itoh & Tatsuya Kikutani & Osamu Hayashida, 2008. "Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups," NBER Chapters, in: Organizational Innovation and Firm Performance, pages 207-228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Hazhir Rahmandad, 2019. "Interdependence, Complementarity, and Ruggedness of Performance Landscapes," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(3), pages 234-249, September.
    13. Prat, Andrea & Dessein, Wouter, 2019. "Organizational Capital, Corporate Leadership, and Firm Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 13513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2009. "Insider Econometrics: Empirical Studies of How Management Matters," NBER Working Papers 15618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Lorenz Kueng & Mu-Jeung Yang & Bryan Hong, 2014. "Sources of Firm Life-Cycle Dynamics: Differentiating Size vs. Age Effects," NBER Working Papers 20621, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Laura Alfaro & Nick Bloom & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger & Patrick Legros & Andrew F Newman & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2024. "Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 34-72.
    17. Nicholas Bloom & Luis Garicano & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2014. "The Distinct Effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 2859-2885, December.
    18. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.
    19. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    20. Bocquet, Rachel & Brossard, Olivier & Sabatier, Mareva, 2007. "Complementarities in organizational design and the diffusion of information technologies: An empirical analysis," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 367-386, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20845. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.