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Corporate apologies are effective because reform signals are weighted more heavily than culpability signals

Author

Listed:
  • Hornsey, Matthew J.
  • Chapman, Cassandra M.
  • La Macchia, Stephen
  • Loakes, Jennifer

Abstract

We report two pre-registered experiments (N = 1,410) designed to provide the first examination of the relative weight consumers give the culpability and reform signals of corporate apologies. Participants read accusations that a company had used a morally dubious supplier. Compared to statements that denied responsibility, apologies increased perceptions of both culpability (that the organization was responsible for the transgression) and of reform (that the organization was unlikely to repeat the transgressions in the future). However, reform signals had stronger impacts on consumer trust and consumer support than culpability signals. Because of this, the net effect of the apology on trust and consumer intentions was generally positive relative to a no-responsibility message and a no-information control condition. Results suggest corporations embroiled in a public scandal will benefit overall from issuing a corporate apology, which should help restore consumer support.

Suggested Citation

  • Hornsey, Matthew J. & Chapman, Cassandra M. & La Macchia, Stephen & Loakes, Jennifer, 2024. "Corporate apologies are effective because reform signals are weighted more heavily than culpability signals," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:177:y:2024:i:c:s0148296324001243
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2024.114620
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