Insurance market mechanisms and government interventions
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- Shim, Jeungbo, 2010. "Capital-based regulation, portfolio risk and capital determination: Empirical evidence from the US property-liability insurers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2450-2461, October.
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