IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/japwor/v72y2024ics092214252400046x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Endogenous decisions on acceptable worker-job mismatch level and the impact on workers’ performance

Author

Listed:
  • Yokoyama, Izumi
  • Obara, Takuya
  • Kiyomoto, Arisa Shichijo
  • Kusada, Kaichi
  • Edamura, Kazuma
  • Inui, Tomohiko

Abstract

This study examines the endogeneity of a worker’s acceptable level of job mismatch and its impact on worker performance. First, we construct a theoretical model that depicts the tendency of a potential worker to take a job offer if the firm is “attractive” for some reason, even when he or she knows that their personality does not align with the firm’s characteristics. According to this model, a strong tendency for this behavior yields a positive relationship between a worker’s acceptable mismatch level and the firm’s attractive characteristics. Given the positive relationship, an instrumental variable estimation confirms that higher mismatch significantly lowers worker performance. Since “attractive” firms tend to be generally large firms with a major influence on the economy, the lowered performance due to these mismatches can hinder economic strength and hamper national growth. Resolving this issue may avoid further losses.

Suggested Citation

  • Yokoyama, Izumi & Obara, Takuya & Kiyomoto, Arisa Shichijo & Kusada, Kaichi & Edamura, Kazuma & Inui, Tomohiko, 2024. "Endogenous decisions on acceptable worker-job mismatch level and the impact on workers’ performance," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:72:y:2024:i:c:s092214252400046x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2024.101283
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092214252400046X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.japwor.2024.101283?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lee, Sun Youn & Ohtake, Fumio, 2018. "Is being agreeable a key to success or failure in the labor market?," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 8-27.
    2. Hanushek, Eric A. & Schwerdt, Guido & Wiederhold, Simon & Woessmann, Ludger, 2015. "Returns to skills around the world: Evidence from PIAAC," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 103-130.
    3. Fatih Guvenen & Burhan Kuruscu & Satoshi Tanaka & David Wiczer, 2020. "Multidimensional Skill Mismatch," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 210-244, January.
    4. James J. Heckman & Jora Stixrud & Sergio Urzua, 2006. "The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 411-482, July.
    5. Peter Fredriksson & Lena Hensvik & Oskar Nordström Skans, 2018. "Mismatch of Talent: Evidence on Match Quality, Entry Wages, and Job Mobility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(11), pages 3303-3338, November.
    6. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    7. Charles Brown, 1980. "Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(1), pages 113-134.
    8. Freeman, Richard B. & Weitzman, Martin L., 1987. "Bonuses and employment in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 168-194, June.
    9. Johnson, Nancy Brown & Provan, Keith G., 1995. "The relationship between work/family benefits and earnings: A test of competing predictions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 571-584.
    10. Ohashi, Isao, 1989. "On the determinants of bonuses and basic wages in large Japanese firms," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 451-479, December.
    11. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    12. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
    13. Kawata, Yuji & Owan, Hideo, 2022. "Peer effects on job satisfaction from exposure to elderly workers," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    14. Kobayashi, Toru & Yamamoto, Isamu, 2020. "Job tasks and wages in the Japanese labor market: Evidence from wage functions," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jacquet, Laurence & Lehmann, Etienne & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2013. "Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1770-1805.
    2. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 17-33.
    3. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    4. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
    5. Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 2007. "Optimal bunching without optimal control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 405-420, May.
    6. Yeom, Sungsoo & Balachandran, Kashi R & Ronen, Joshua, 2000. "The Role of Transfer Price for Coordination and Control within a Firm," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 161-192, March.
    7. Alasseur, Clémence & Chaton, Corinne & Hubert, Emma, 2022. "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    8. Aaron Lowen & Paul Sicilian, 2009. "“Family-Friendly” Fringe Benefits and the Gender Wage Gap," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 30(2), pages 101-119, June.
    9. Zou, Liang, 1992. "Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 47-74, March.
    10. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    11. Esteban Aucejo & Jonathan James, 2021. "The Path to College Education: The Role of Math and Verbal Skills," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(10), pages 2905-2946.
    12. Mirjam Bächli & Hélène Benghalem & Doriana Tinello & Damaris Aschwanden & Sascha Zuber & Matthias Kliegel & Michele Pellizzari & Rafael Lalive, 2024. "Ranking occupations by their proximity to workers’ profiles," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 160(1), pages 1-17, December.
    13. Laurence Jacquet & Etienne lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2012. "Signing distortions in optimal tax or other adverse selection models with random participation," THEMA Working Papers 2012-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    14. Michael J. Kottelenberg & Steven F. Lehrer, 2019. "How Skills and Parental Valuation of Education Influence Human Capital Acquisition and Early Labor Market Return to Human Capital in Canada," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(S2), pages 735-778.
    15. van Egteren, Henry, 1996. "Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1773-1797, December.
    16. Isaac Baley & Ana Figueiredo & Robert Ulbricht, 2022. "Mismatch Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(11), pages 2943-2984.
    17. Lennart Ziegler, 2020. "Skill Demand and Posted Wages. Evidence from Online Job Ads in Austria," Vienna Economics Papers vie2002, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    18. Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Unionized Labor Market and Regulation of Monopoly," MPRA Paper 17279, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
    20. Eliana Carranza & Robert Garlick & Kate Orkin & Neil Rankin, 2020. "Job Search and Hiring with Two-sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills," CSAE Working Paper Series 2020-10, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mismatch; Workers’ performance; Firms’ characteristics; Participation constraint; Instrumental variable;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:72:y:2024:i:c:s092214252400046x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505557 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.