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Courts as monitoring agents: The case of China

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  • Dong, Xiaoge
  • Voigt, Stefan

Abstract

This paper shows that courts are not only a crucial part of the rule of law in the conventional sense, but that they can also serve an important function in revealing information to the central government about the performance of lower level governments. When courts function in this informative way, the central government is able to improve the performance of lower level governments. After developing a general argument in that vein, the recent reforms to the Chinese court system are partially interpreted as an attempt to make the courts monitoring agents for the central government. Based on primary data from more than 1000 Chinese local courts, the argument is tested empirically and its hypotheses are largely confirmed.

Suggested Citation

  • Dong, Xiaoge & Voigt, Stefan, 2022. "Courts as monitoring agents: The case of China," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:69:y:2022:i:c:s0144818822000023
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2022.106046
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497, September.
    2. Pan, Jennifer & Chen, Kaiping, 2018. "Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 602-620, August.
    3. John P. Burns & Zhou Zhiren, 2010. "Performance Management in the Government of the People's Republic of China: Accountability and Control in the Implementation of Public Policy," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 1-28.
    4. Voigt, Stefan, 2012. "On the optimal number of courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 49-62.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Court system of China; Court reforms; Courts-as-information-providers; Courts as monitoring agents;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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