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On the optimal number of courts

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  • Voigt, Stefan

Abstract

This is the first paper to investigate whether the number of high courts in a country has systematic effects both on the quality of its legal system and on its level of economic development more generally. It is theorized that due to the division of labor and a higher degree of specialization, high courts might be advantageous in terms of court productivity. Yet, they might also be disadvantageous in terms of a less coherent legal system. It is empirically tested whether the positive or the negative effects prevail. Results show that a larger number of high courts never has any positive effects on very broad outcome variables; indeed, with regard to some of these, a greater number of high courts is correlated with worse outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Voigt, Stefan, 2012. "On the optimal number of courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 49-62.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:1:p:49-62
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2011.12.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lode Vereeck & Manuela Mühl, 2000. "An Economic Theory of Court Delay," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 243-268, November.
    2. Blume, Lorenz & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 215-229, June.
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    10. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
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    12. Voigt, Stefan & Ebeling, Michael & Blume, Lorenz, 2007. "Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence--the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 348-373, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hornuf, Lars & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Preliminary References — Analyzing the Determinants that Made the ECJ the Powerful Court it Is," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2dg9t3x9, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Goerke, Laszlo & Neugart, Michael, 2015. "Lobbying and dismissal dispute resolution systems," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 50-62.
    3. Dong, Xiaoge & Voigt, Stefan, 2022. "Courts as monitoring agents: The case of China," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    4. Przemyslaw Banasik & Monika Odlanicka-Poczobutt & Maciej Wolny & Sylwia Morawska, 2020. "Preliminary Identification of Quantitative Factors Determining the Duration of Court Proceedings in Commercial Cases," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 1), pages 279-293.
    5. Dong, Xiaoge, 2021. "Efficiency of Courts in China – Does Location Matter?," ILE Working Paper Series 50, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    6. Lars Hornuf & Stefan Voigt, 2015. "Analyzing preliminary references as the powerbase of the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 287-311, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Organization of courts; Specialized courts; Constitutional vs. supreme courts; Independence of courts vs. constitutional review; Legal origins; Consistency of judicial decision-making; Court capture; Judges’ productivity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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