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Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances

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  • PAN, JENNIFER
  • CHEN, KAIPING

Abstract

A prerequisite for the durability of authoritarian regimes as well as their effective governance is the regime’s ability to gather reliable information about the actions of lower-tier officials. Allowing public participation in the form of online complaints is one approach authoritarian regimes have taken to improve monitoring of lower-tier officials. In this paper, we gain rare access to internal communications between a monitoring agency and upper-level officials in China. We show that citizen grievances posted publicly online that contain complaints of corruption are systematically concealed from upper-level authorities when they implicate lower-tier officials or associates connected to lower-tier officials through patronage ties. Information manipulation occurs primarily through omission of wrongdoing rather than censorship or falsification, suggesting that even in the digital age, in a highly determined and capable regime where reports of corruption are actively and publicly voiced, monitoring the behavior of regime agents remains a challenge.

Suggested Citation

  • Pan, Jennifer & Chen, Kaiping, 2018. "Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 602-620, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:112:y:2018:i:03:p:602-620_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Han, 2021. "How Using Machine Learning Classification as a Variable in Regression Leads to Attenuation Bias and What to Do About It," SocArXiv 453jk, Center for Open Science.
    2. CHEN, Xuezheng & GUI, Lin & WU, Tao & ZHANG, Jun, 2024. "A theory of symbiotic corruption," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 478-494.
    3. David Karpa & Torben Klarl & Michael Rochlitz, 2021. "Artificial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Big Data," Papers 2111.00992, arXiv.org.
    4. Liu, Zhuang & Wong, T.J. & Yi, Yang & Zhang, Tianyu, 2022. "Authoritarian transparency: China's missing cases in court disclosure," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 221-239.
    5. Dong, Xiaoge & Voigt, Stefan, 2022. "Courts as monitoring agents: The case of China," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    6. Shen, Shiran V & Wang, Qi & Zhang, Bing, 2023. "Regularized Campaigns as a New Institution for Effective Governance," Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper Series qt0d83b2rw, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California.
    7. Maiting Zhuang, 2022. "Intergovernmental Conflict and Censorship: Evidence from China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(6), pages 2540-2585.
    8. Qi Wang & Mengdi Liu & Jintao Xu & Bing Zhang, 2023. "Blow the Lid Off: Public Complaints, Bargaining Power, and Government Responsiveness on Social Media," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 85(1), pages 133-166, May.
    9. Wang, Qi & Liu, Mengdi & Xu, Jintao & Zhang, Bing, 2023. "Blow the Lid Off: Public Complaints, Bargaining Power, and Government Responsiveness on Social Media," EfD Discussion Paper 23-5, Environment for Development, University of Gothenburg.

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